Back From Wonderland: A Linguistic Approach to Duties Arising from Threats of Physical Violence by Harmon, A.G.
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
CUA Law Scholarship Repository 
Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions Faculty Scholarship 
2008 
Back From Wonderland: A Linguistic Approach to Duties Arising 
from Threats of Physical Violence 
A.G. Harmon 
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar 
Recommended Citation 
A.G. Harmon, Back From Wonderland: A Linguistic Approach to Duties Arising from Threats of Physical 
Violence, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 27 (2008). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions by an authorized 
administrator of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
BACK FROM WONDERLAND: A LINGUISTIC APPROACH
TO DUTIES ARISING FROM THREATS
OF PHYSICAL VIOLENCE
A.G. HARMON, J.D., PH.D.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The tragedy of school shootings and violent rampages over the past
few years always raises the same grim questions: "How could this have
been prevented?" "Didn't somebody know the person was disturbed?"
"Weren't there some signs in what he said or in the way that he acted?"
The recent shootings at Virginia Tech University in the spring of 2007,1
and at Northern Illinois University in 2008,2 are only the latest incidents in
a long litany of such events. After studies related to incidents of this
nature are completed, undoubtedly some of the violent perpetrators will
have been under the care of a therapist; and when that is the case, the law
has a forty-year history of determining the therapist's actionable duties.
However, the law has never had a clear perspective on exactly how to
determine when an event has triggered a duty towards a threatened
individual or society at large.
For example, on October 4, 1989, Dennis Little, who had once
absconded across state lines with his infant daughter, and who had a
history of arson and assault charges, told his mental health counselor that
Copyright © 2008, A.G. Harmon, J.D., Ph.D.
* The Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of America. The author
wishes to thank his colleagues, Professors Matin Scordato, Kathryn Kelly, Lisa Everhart,
Robert Destro, for their invaluable commentary; Dr. Anca Nemoianu, for her guidance in
the field of linguistics; and Drs. David Jobes and Monroe Pointer for their contributions in
the area of psychoanalysis. He also wishes to acknowledge the research assistance of
Michael S. Mitchell, J.D. 2007, and the editorial assistance of Stephanie M. Holmes, J.D.
2008.
1 Thirty-two people were killed and numerous others wounded before the assailant
committed suicide on April 16, 2007. Ian Shapira & Tom Jackman, Gunman Kills 32 at
Virginia Tech in Deadliest Shooting in U.S. History, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at Al.
2 Five people were killed and numerous others wounded before the assailant committed
suicide on February 14, 2008. Peter Slevin & Kari Lydersen, Gunman at Illinois College
Kills 5 Students, Wounds 16, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2008, at Al.
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he "just didn't think things was [sic] going right.",3 Further, he told the
counselor that he "was afraid [he] might hurt [his wife], ' and that he "was
having these stupid thoughts and [felt] like things was [sic] going wrong.
[He] described the 'stupid thoughts' as 'when you are depressed
and.., not working, you know, you think about all kinds of stuff, armed
robbery, murder, arson [and] ... suicide." Little indicated that he had "a
lot of those [stupid] thoughts. 5
The counselor had known Little for five months, during which time he
had expressed homicidal and suicidal desires and was in and out of
treatment programs due to mental health problems.6 But instead of
hospitalization, Little was placed in a treatment center, from which he
could come and go.7 One day after being placed in the treatment center,
Little appeared at his wife's home, where his wife found him staring at a
butcher's knife and contemplating suicide.8 Little's wife returned him to
the treatment center, informing a staff member of the incident and how she
feared both for her own safety and that of Little. 9 The next day, Little
returned to his wife's home and attacked her, stabbing her repeatedly.' °
Their minor son was in the house during the attack." Little's wife
(hereafter "plaintiff") eventually sued the counseling center 2 claiming that
the therapists had breached their duty under the Arizona Duty to Warn
statute, which arises whenever "[t]he patient [had] communicated to the
mental health provider an explicit threat of imminent serious physical harm
or death to a clearly identified or identifiable victim ....







9 Id. at 1371.
1O Id.
"Id
'21d. at 1371. Defendant Phoenix South operated the counseling center, Defendant
HDI. Id. at 1370.
' Id. at 1371 (citing ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02(A)(1) (2003)). The plaintiff




In its review of a directed verdict in favor of the defendants, 14 the
Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiff's claim on the following
grounds:
In essence, [plaintiff] argues that, to a mental health
professional trained to understand mentally ill patients, "an
explicit threat" should not be limited to statements such as
"I intend to kill my wife immediately." Plaintiff further
contends that "the rambling discourse of a schizophrenic
patient who asks to be put into a mental hospital because
he has 'stupid thoughts' of armed robbery, murder, arson
and suicide" is sufficient to meet the requirements of § 36-
517.02(A)(1). We disagree.
15
The court referred to the state supreme court's view that "reference to
established, respected dictionaries is appropriate in determining the
commonly accepted meaning of words in a statute."' 6  Consulting the
American Heritage Dictionary, the court noted that the term explicit is
commonly defined as "'expressed with clarity and precision' or 'clearly
defined or formulated'; threat as "an expression of an intention to inflict
pain, injury, evil, or punishment"; and imminent as "about to occur;
impending."17 Therefore, the court held the statutory requirement that the
threat be explicit excluded "non-verbal threats [and] insinuations."'
' 8
Aside from the fact that different dictionaries express things
differently, 19 and that semantic determination itself is often controversial,2°
the Arizona court's ruling-and perhaps the statutory drafters before it-
the statute. Id. at 1372. The court agreed and remanded the case to the trial court because
the trial court had based its decision on the now-unconstitutional statute. Id. at 1376.
14Id. at 1369.
"5 Id. at 1373.
16Id. (quoting Sierra Tucson, Inc. v. Pima County, 871 P.2d 762, 767 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994)).
17 Id. (quoting AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 478, 1265, 643 (2d ed. 1991)).
18 Id.
19 See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a
Fortress: The United States Supreme Court's Use Of Dictionaries, 47 BuFF. L. REv. 227,
242 (1999).
20See DAvID FOSTER WALLACE, Authority and American Usage, in CONSIDER THE
LOBSTER AND OTHER ESSAYS, 66, 78-79 (2006).
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overlooks entire dimensions of linguistic reality; for meaning can be
conveyed in ways other than through semantics. It is a principle of
everyday language use that statements, or "locutions," can carry clear
meaning when expressed in less than direct ways.21 Indeed, a good portion
of everyday conversation is intentionally circuitous, 22 adding depth and
texture to communication. So what would be the result if the patient in
Little had said to his therapist, "My wife might not wake up tomorrow"?
That statement too is far less than an "expression of an intention to inflict
pain, injury, evil, or punishment," which the Arizona court required to
make a claim under the statute. The statement is not an expression of any
intention at all, in fact, and it could be construed as simply pure conjecture
or speculation. But in the context of a disturbed and historically violent
man, the meaning conveyed would be quite clear. Would such a statement
fail to trigger a duty to warn in Arizona? Is such a statement not a "threat"
only because it is not expressed in conformity to an arbitrary dictionary
definition, randomly selected?
Since the landmark case of Tarasoff v. Regents of University of
California,z3 which imposed upon mental health professionals an
affirmative duty to warn third parties who are the subject of credible
threats uttered by their patients,24 nearly every jurisdiction has made either
a common law or statutory rule to address the circumstance. 2' These rules
range from the mandatory to the discretionary in nature, from the precise to
the general, and cover a variety of violent intentions: from third parties, to
suicides, to real property.26 The initial decision, almost thirty-five years
21C.f id. at92.
22 C.f id. at 10.
23 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974) [hereinafter Tarasoff 1], vacated, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976)
[hereinafter Tarasoff Il]. The Tarasoff case has been the subject of immense legal
commentary from a variety of perspectives. A recent survey of case law dealing with the
matter is that of Damon Muir Walcott, Pat Cerundolo, & James C. Beck, Current Analysis
of the Tarasoff Duty: An Evolution Towards the Limitation of the Duty to Protect, 19
BEHAV. Scl. & L. 325 (2001). A recent article focusing on practical dimensions of the case,
as well as providing philosophical analysis of the opinion, is that of Marin Roger Scordato,
Post-Realist Blues: Formalism, Instrumentalism, and the Hybrid Nature of Common Law
Jurisprudence, 7 NEV. L.J. 263 (2007).
24 Tarasoff l, 551 P.2d at 340.




old, has never ceased to be controversial, though some of the strongest
fears that it first elicited have been somewhat assuaged.27 Nevertheless,
the conflicting duties of the therapist to the patient and to the victim, the
policy matters revolving around privileges and public safety, and the
expansion of liability on affirmative duty grounds, are still debated.28 In
addition, case law has done surprisingly little to explain what factors are
determinative of the triggering event. A discussion of exactly what facts
are pertinent to the deliberation of whether a threat of the requisite nature
has been made, thereby triggering the duty, is rare. Most often the dispute
has been resolved on the grounds that the threat to the victim was too
ambiguous, as in Little.29 But this only postpones the day when factors
will be needed. Finally, the relevance of expert witnesses has been called
into question, raising the issue of whether the claim is one of simple
negligence or professional negligence. 30 But if there is no unique ability in
the therapist to discern the quality of the threat posed, there is no reason to
limit the duty at all. As one judge has opined, if the duty were to turn
simply upon knowledge of the threat, what is the reason for not expanding
the duty to people other than therapists?
31
With current figures evidencing the frequency of such tragic events,
32
the postponement of the question cannot be indefinite. Eventually,
circumstances will arise as they have in other contexts involving
27See ALAN A. STONE, LAW, PSYCHIATRY, AND MORALITY 181 (1984); Daniel J.
Givelber, et al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action,
1984 Wis. L. REV. 443, 489-97 (1984).
28 Scordato, supra note 23, at 264.
29 Little v. All Phoenix S. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 919 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995).
30 Ewing v. Northridge Hosp. Med. Ctr., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 600 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
31 Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. for Human Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1046 (Pa. 1998)
(Zappala, J., concurring).
32 Statistics on acts of violence by those under psychiatric care are not available, but
there were twenty-four school-related shootings in the United States from April 14, 2003 to
April 16, 2007. See BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, No GN LEFT BEHIND: THE
GUN LOBBY'S CAMPAIGN TO PUSH GUNS INTO COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS app. B at 27-30
(May 2007), available at http://www.bradycampaign.org/xshare/pdf/reports/no-gun-left-
behind.pdf.
2008]
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
language-most often criminal in nature33 -and interpretation of the
language itself will be necessary. For jurisdictions that impose the duty to
warn, or absolve the therapist from having to relay the same, all turn upon
the occurrence of a singular episode: an event; with either a spoken act or
an unspoken composite of acts that, taken together, amount to the same
thing.34 And though the establishment of such an event might at first seem
to pose only a modest evidentiary hurdle, especially in terms of the speech
act, the truth is that "threats," like other speech acts, are subject to a variety
of interpretive maxims and conditions. 35 In fact, whether a "threat" has
actually been uttered is a difficult determination.36
For example, when a troubled middle-aged man states that he fears
doing "something stupid" like "getting rid" of someone that is "always
going around the house nagging me," is the statement specific enough to
qualify as a threat? Are its terms unambiguous, and therefore within a
precise semantic field of reference? Does it matter if the man made the
statement while smiling or with his back turned? What if he conditions the
statement with a preface: "If he wasn't in jail. . ."; or "If he wasn't out of
town for two weeks . . ."? What if the statement is not made by a middle-
aged man but by a sixteen-year-old boy? A sixteen-year-old girl?
It might be suggested that the consequences of these variations could
be distinguished by seeking more information, clarified by asking more
questions, probing further, as it were. But when does the probing itself
become another type of speech event-subornation-so that whatever
statement is ultimately made becomes vulnerable to the charge that it was
33 See ROGER W. SHuy, LANGUAGE CRIMES: THE USE AND ABUSE OF LANGUAGE
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM 1 (1993) (language alone can lead to criminal liability);
People v. Toledo, 26 P.3d 1051, 1052 (Cal. 2001) (criminal threats); People v. Hines, 780
P.2d 556, 557-58 (Colo. 1989) (criminal threats). Threats against public officials, political
leaders, and the President are also the subject of separate jurisprudential schemes. See
United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1020 (2d Cir. 1976) (threats against a foreign
leader); United States v. Roberts, 915 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1990) (threats against a
judge); United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1986) (threats against the
President). For a linguistic interpretation of cases involving threats against the life of the
President, see Brenda Danet, Kenneth B. Hoffman & Nicole C. Kermish, Threats to the Life
of the President: An Analysis of Linguistic Issues, 1980 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 180 (1980).
34 See infra Part Ill.
35 Bruce Fraser, Threatening Revisited, 5 FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 159, 169-70 (1998).
36 Id. at 171-72.
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pulled from the patient, elicited rather than volunteered? 37 And what if the
speaker will not answer further? What if he refuses to elaborate? With
conflicting duties--one owed to the patient,38 to retain the sanctity of the
therapeutic privilege, and one owed to the identifiable victim, to warn of a
potential threat of violence-the therapist must make a determination.
Consequently, if the therapist is sued either by the patient or by the victim,
what factors should a judge consider in determining whether the speech
act-the "threat"--was truly a "threat"? Again, in those rules that require
a communication (and as this article will argue, even those that do not), the
37 See SHUY, supra note 33, at 154-55.
38 The American Psychiatric Association does make an allowance for confidentiality in
cases such as those involved in Tarasoff contexts: "When in the clinical judgment of the
treating psychiatrist the risk of danger is deemed to be significant, the psychiatrist may
reveal confidential information disclosed by the patient." AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, THE
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS: WITH ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO
PSYCHIATRY 6 (1995 ed.). The American Medical Association's ethics rules carry a similar
qualification:
The physician should not reveal confidential information without the
express consent of the patient, subject to certain exceptions which are
ethically justified because of overriding considerations.
When a patient threatens to inflict serious physical harm to another
person or to him or herself and there is a reasonable probability that the
patient may carry out the threat, the physician should take reasonable
precautions for the protection of the intended victim, which may
include notification of law enforcement authorities.
COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS OF THE AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION § 5.05 (2008-2009 ed. 2008). However, the confidentiality aspect
has proven a sore sticking point for psychotherapists. See Joseph Dubey, Confidentiality as
a Requirement of the Therapist: Technical Necessities for Absolute Privilege in
Psychotherapy, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1093 (1974) (discussing the conflict between the
goals of psychotherapy and the goals of parties involved in litigation). The United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of patient candor and trust in the
relationship with the therapist. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996). The possibility
of a negative dynamic-that of the psychotherapist avoiding patients who might trigger the
duty-is discussed in D.L. Rosenhan et al., Warning Third Parties: The Ripple Effects of
Tarasoff, 24 PAC. L.J. 1165, 1209 (1993). Another possible effect of Tarasoff could be
avoiding the triggering conversation itself.
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duty to the third party under Tarasoff is only breached if that determination
can be made.
Linguistics, more particularly, the branch known as pragmatics, can
provide guidance here. Pragmatics is the study of language in a situational
context, as opposed to decontextualized structure,39 and what it can add to
an understanding of meaning through context is crucial to understanding
when a Tarasoff duty has arisen. For the objection of the therapist might
often fall along the lines of "I didn't know he meant that;" or more
precisely, "Considering what I knew, there was no reasonable way to
determine that he meant that." Under the laws as written, the catalytic
event is whether the therapist heard a threat-not whether the therapist
should have "thought he would do it," but whether he "heard him say he
would"--that triggers the duty.40 And even when the standard is one of
"foreseeability of harm" (not communication of a threat), this article will
show that the evidence used for determining the existence of a real "threat"
is the same as that necessary for determining the circumstances that
implicate foreseeability. In short, pragmatics can help establish whether
the triggering event occurred or not.
Although linguists have considered language crimes before,4' relating
to perjury,42 bribery, 43 and criminal threats,44 a linguistic analysis of speech
acts in the civil law Tarasoff context has not been attempted. So what
exactly is a "threat" in that context? What are its determinatives? How
can it be expressed? And in this peculiar legal context, how can it be
recognized?
In fact, the very use of the term "threat" for what transpires in a
Tarasoff context is incorrect from a linguistics perspective. For a "threat"
to be a "threat," the speaker must address the intended harm to the hearer.
In a Tarasoff context, the statement made by the speaker to the hearer
concerns harm intended against a third party. So in the vernacular, when a
witness tells the police "He threatened he was going to go downtown and
shoot his wife," the witness is using the word "threat" to refer to a threat
39e STEPHEN C. LEViNSON, PRAGMATICS 7-9 (1983).
40 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007).
41 See sources cited supra note 33.
42 See SHUY, supra note 33, at 136-56.




uttered by another only; "threat" here is only a manner of speaking. In the
strict sense, a speaker cannot threaten someone who is not there. What is
actually happening in a Tarasoff context is that the speaker is reporting to
the hearer a claim of intended violence against a third party, or a "pledge to
harm," as will be explained in the next part. Despite this fact, an
understanding of the nature of "real" threats, known as "felicitous
' 45
threats in the pragmatics field, is necessary in order to understand the
nature of a felicitous "pledge to harm," as the latter triggers the duty to
warn.
The following analysis intends to explain what is happening at the
level of language when a speaker (in the Tarasoff context, always a
patient) has communicated to a hearer (in the Tarasoff context, always
some kind of mental health provider) a "threat" or "pledge to harm ' 46 a
victim. It seeks to clarify how statutes comport or fail to comport with that
reality, and will provide a concrete scheme by which triers of fact can
determine compliance with a standard of care. As Justice Mosk stated in
Tarasoff with regard to the imposition of what he considered inexact and
imprecise duties, we have moved "from the world of reality into the
wonderland of clairvoyance. '' 7 With that assessment in mind, this article
also attempts to show the danger lying in the affirmative duty and in the
strange genesis of that duty. This article also attempts to emphasize the
care judges must take in acknowledging from whence such a duty arises-
by whom and to whom it is owed. Only then can we move from the
wonderland back to the world.
Part II will explain the areas of linguistics that most impact the
statements that the layman understands to be a "threat." Part III will
analyze the mandatory "Duty To Warn" rules, both statutory and common
law, that sprang up after Tarasoff to put limits on the duty. It will also
45 This term was coined by John Austin in his groundbreaking work on speech acts,
How To Do Things with Words. J.L. AUSTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 14
(Oxford University Press 1967) (1962).
46 As has been stated, the term "threat" is incorrect in relation to what is happening in
the Tarasoffcontext, but as the term is used in its vernacular sense in this area, it is retained
in conjunction with its more proper characterization, a "pledge to harm." For brevity's sake,
the slashed term "threat/pledge" is used for what is commonly (and incorrectly) known in
the law as a "threat."
47 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 354 (Cal. 1976) (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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explain the extent to which such rules comport with linguistic reality. Part
IV reviews cases in which communications were analyzed under the
respective statutes. It will explain two ways that courts have failed both to
articulate factors by which they are determining the communication to be a
"threat" and to understand the significance of direct threats made by
indirect means. Part V will explain the dangers in some current
understandings of the duty's genesis and the importance of expert
testimony. Part VI will propose a new means by which to evaluate
whether a certain statement triggers a duty, incorporating linguistic
imperatives and professional standards into the scheme. Part VII will
restate the importance of this new perspective.
II. LINGUISTICS AND THE LAW
A. Pragmatics: Implicature
Intending to convey meaning by implication is so commonly
understood that to the layperson any explanation would seem unnecessary.
But for linguists, an intricate, albeit unconscious, process of
communication is related between the speaker and the hearer. Philosopher
Paul Grice gave the name "implicature" to a proposition's implication that
is not part of the utterance and does not necessarily follow from it.
48
For example, a client might ask his accountant whether he needs to
report certain cash income on his income tax return for the year, to which
the accountant could reply: "Do you want to get audited?" Obviously, a
layperson would suggest, the accountant is really saying: "The law requires
you to report that income." But at the level of language, a great deal must
take place in order for that meaning to be conveyed in the indirect way that
it is. 49 First, the implicature, "The law requires you to report that income"
is not part of the accountant's utterance; by definition, the implication is
always unspoken. Second, the implicature is not "entailed." That is, the
implicature does not follow as a matter of course from the utterance. If the
accountant had responded to the client's question: "You have to report that
income on page two of your return," then the broader answer, "The law
requires you to report that income," would be entailed within the answer
48 H.P. Grice, Logic and Conversation, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS 41,
43-44 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
49 Sarcasm is typical of the kind of speech that uses indirectness to achieve its effect;
some types of humor, such as satire, are other examples.
[37:27
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given. In the above exchange, by responding to the client's question with
another question--"Do you want to get audited?"-the accountant is said
to "raise the implicature" that the income must be reported.
Where implicature and violent "threats" intersect relates to whether
certain principles of language are observed in a particular exchange. As
Grice points out, conversations between two people can only take place if
the conversants are "cooperative" with each other-giving the amount and
type of true information that is called for, and in the manner that is
expected under the circumstances.5°  The philosopher identified the
following "maxims":
Maxim of Quality: The conversant responds with true
information.51
Maxim of Quantity: The conversant responds with the
amount of information-no more and no less-that is
called for.
52
Maxim of Relation: The conversant responds with
relevant information (the example above and the
explanation below).53
Maxim of Manner: How the conversant responds.54
But when a conversant intentionally replies in a way that breaks one of
these maxims, he or she is said to have "flouted" that maxim. 55 By
flouting the maxim of relation, the accountant in the example above "raises
the implicature" that taxes are owed. The client unconsciously reasons as
follows: To my question about reporting cash income, Accountant did not
answer yes or no, but asked me a question about something other than
reporting income-i.e. whether I wanted to get audited, which of course I
don't. I asked him about one thing and he told me about something else.
He intentionally did this, so I infer that if I don't report the income, I risk
an audit.
50 Grice, supra note 48, at 45-46.
5t Id. at46.
52 Id. at 45-46.
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In the example above, the maxims of both relation and manner are
flouted, in that the accountant answered with unrelated information and
answered a question with a question rather than with a direct statement. In
response to the client's question, other ways to flout maxims and yet imply
the same meaning would be:
Maxim of Quality: Accountant replies "Of course not.
The IRS only cares about non-cash income, not cash
income" (an obvious lie).
Maxim of Quantity: Accountant replies with the
expression "Duh" (less information than is called for).
Maxim of Manner: Accountant replies by singing
"Folsom Prison Blues" (singing instead of stating a
response; this example also flouts relation).
As can be seen, conversational implicature involves a swift cognitive
process transpiring within the hearer. What seems a sophisticated
procedure actually happens with common occurrence in everyday
communication. But the clarity of the meaning, as well as its sincerity, is
no greater or no less than if the speaker had spoken more directly. And
that fact is significant for the Tarasoff context. For in twenty-three out of
the twenty-seven rules that imply a mandatory duty, the duty arises only
upon the communication of the "threat" from the speaker to the hearer.56
Much time is spent deliberating whether the professional "should have"
been aware under professional standards that a duty to warn has arisen, but
that is only another way of saying that the mental health professional
should have understood the statement or circumstances to pose a felicitous
threat/pledge. That is, whether the professional heard something that
amounted to that class of locutions or witnessed some thing or things that
amounted to the same. If so, the duty will arise, whether the
communication is made directly or through implicature. Examples of
raising the implicature of intended violence in a Tarasoff context include
the following:
Flouting the Maxim of Quality:
THERAPIST: "Do you intend to harm X?
56 See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
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PATIENT: "I love X and I'm glad he'll get to live a
long, happy life with the only girl I've ever really cared
about."
Flouting the Maxim of Quantity:
THERAPIST: "Do you intend to harm X?"
PATIENT: "I'd like to pluck every hair from X's head
and then every lash from X's eyebrows and then every
fingernail from.. ." etc.
Flouting the Maxim of Relation:
THERAPIST: "Do you intend to harm X?"
PATIENT: "X might drive off a cliff."
Flouting the Maxim of Manner:
THERAPIST: "Do you intend to harm X?"
PATIENT: "Ashes to Ashes, Dust to Dust."
The trouble caused by maxim-flouting is that meanings implied via
implicature are no less "explicit" than a more direct form of
communication. And while a statutory or common law duty might require
"explicitness" as an element of the duty, as in Little,57 it must be
understood that this form of communication-via implicature-is only less
direct, not less explicit, than a "yes" or "no" answer. Criteria may be
applied, as discussed below in Part V, to determine whether the locution
via implicature should have given rise to a duty, but a duty nevertheless
arises. How a particular therapist or other defined health care professional
understands such statements and what information could help in discerning
matters such as capability, sincerity, etc., must follow an examination of
another area of pragmatics-speech acts.
57 Little v. All Phoenix S. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 919 P.2d 1368, 1373 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995); see also supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
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B. Pragmatics: Speech Act Theory
1. Illocutionary Acts
Other means by which a "pledge to harm" can be made involve the
field of study known as "speech acts." The British philosopher John
Austin has explained that while there are statements that seek to describe a
reality-and can be judged "true" or "false"-there are also statements that
not only say something, but also do something. 8 If the accountant in the
example above decided that his retort ("Do you want to get audited?") was
a bit sarcastic (especially when made to a paying client), he might
immediately add: "Sorry for being such a jerk." According to Austin, the
accountant is not only saying something-the words of the apology; he is
actually doing something-making the apology itself.59  This statement
involves two things: the locutionary act (i.e., what is said) and the
illocutionary act (i.e., what is done; here, the apology).60  What is
interesting about the illocutionary act is that it can be one of several types,
depending upon which force is meant to be conveyed: a question, a
command, a confession, etc.61 Austin's pupil, the philosopher John
58 AUSTIN, supra note 45, at 98-99.
59 Austin termed such acts "performatives"; i.e., locutions that "perform" the act that
they name. Id. at 6-7. For example, it is impossible to use the word "promise" without
making a "promise." The use of the word performs the act it intends. Although there are
some aspects about threats that are more "performative" in essence than constantive--e.g.,
they can only be performed in words-according to Bruce Fraser a threat is not a
performative because it can never be explicitly stated:
[T]he [addressee's] belief in the unfavourableness of the resulting state
of the world and the intention to intimidate are seldom explicitly
present. To perform an indirect threat, the speaker is under no such
obligation [to make them explicit] and sentences covering a wide range
of topics in every syntactic form can count as indirect threats, providing
a connection can be made between what is said and the unfavourable
act and results.
Fraser, supra note 35, at 169.
60 See AUSTIN, supra note 45, at 98.




Searle,62 set up a classification of illocutionary acts that will be followed
here:
1. Representatives: A statement by which speakers commit
themselves to the truth of the proposition made. 63
E.g., "The sky is blue." (Under this category would fit
illocutionary acts such as asserting, confessing,
admitting, forecasting, etc.)
2. Directives: A statement by which speakers intend to get
their hearers to do something. 64
E.g., "Go to the grocery store for me." (Under this
category would fit illocutionary acts such as insisting,
demanding, requesting, advising, etc.)
3. Commissives: A statement by which speakers commit
themselves to certain expressed acts. 65
E.g., "I'll help you with your homework." (Under this
category would fit illocutionary acts such as promising,
vowing, pledging, etc.)
4. Expressives: A statement by which speakers convey
their internal psychological states or feelings. 66
E.g., "You have my sympathy for your loss." (Under
this category would fit illocutionary acts such as
apologizing, congratulating, condoling, objecting, etc.)
62 Searle is of the opinion "that the basic unit of human linguistic communication is the
illocutionary act." Id. at 1.
63Id. at 10.
64 Id. at 11. Searle includes questions-requests for information-as directives. Id. at
11 n.2.
65 Id. at 11. Searle notes G.E.M. Anscombe's point that each illocutionary act seeks
either to match the "world to the words" (I am going to make my statement come true in the
world) or the "words to the world" (I am going to make my words resemble some truth in
the world). Id. at 3-4, 10-11. A pledge, as a commissive, seeks to make the boast, or bet,
or pledge, become objectively true in the world, and therefore its "direction of fit" is "world
to words." Id. at 11; see also G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (Basil Blackwell 1957).
66 Searle, supra note 61, at 12.
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5. Declarations: A statement by which speakers change the
67status of some entity.
E.g., "You're under arrest." (Under this category would
fit illocutionary acts such as christening, surrendering,
excluding, bestowing, etc.)
A true "threat" would fall under the category of "commissives," as the
speaker commits himself to do something, i.e., harm the hearer. Indeed,
for a true threat, linguist Bruce Fraser sets out the following criteria:
1. The speaker's expressed intention to commit an act or to
have it committed.68
2. The speaker's belief that the act will be unfavorable to
the hearer (regardless of whether it truly will be or not).69
3. The speaker's intention to intimidate the hearer through
the hearer's awareness of the speaker's intention.7°
However, in order to perform the locutionary act with the requisite
illocutionary force, Austin also noted that certain conditions must be
present,7' depending upon the class to which the statement belonged. For
example, if someone other than an ordained priest or minister attempted to
baptize a child with the words "I name thee Mary Anne," the act of
"declaring" would fail, since a requisite condition is absent; the utterance is
,,72said to be "invalid" or "infelicitous. These requisite conditions are
called "felicity conditions" 73 and they correspond as follows:
1. Preparatory Conditions: condition(s) that precede the
utterance.74 E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious
67Id. at 13-14.
68 Fraser, supra note 35, at 160-61.
69Id. at 161.
70 Id.
71 AusTiN, supra note 45, at 14.
72 See id. at 34.
73 JoHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS 54-74 (1969). Searle provides an in-depth discussion
on the "structure of illocutionary acts." Id.
74 Id. at 58-60.
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sense), the penitent must have done something wrong
under the code of his faith.
2. Sincerity Conditions: conditions that relate to the
speaker's state of mind.7 5 E.g., for a valid confession (in
the religious sense), the penitent must be truly sorry for the
wrong he has done.
3. Essential Conditions: conditions that require the
utterance be recognizable as the type of illocutionary act in
question.76 E.g., for a valid confession (in the religious
sense), the penitent must express his contrition in a
confessional booth or some other dedicated space, to a
priest or minister, using language or formulary phrases that
imply regret -"I confess that..."
4. Propositional Content Conditions: conditions that relate
to the proper context of the statement.77 E.g., for a valid
confession (in the religious sense), the penitent's utterance
must predicate the penitent's past act--"I'm sorry that I
lied to my wife."
With this understanding of both the criteria for a "true threat," as well as
the necessity of meeting felicity conditions, it becomes apparent that what
lawyers, jurists, and legislators refer to as a violent "threat" towards a third
party is not really a "threat" at all. One of the preparatory conditions of a
"threat" is that the threatened party be present-indeed, he must be the
addressee-the "hearer. 78 In the Tarasoff context, the intended victim is
absent.79  In addition, the speaker must seek to intimidate the
addressee/hearer through the utterance. 0 In the Tarasoff context, the
speaker does not seek to intimidate the therapist, who is the
addressee/hearer; in fact, intimidation is not part of the motivation at all.
" See id. at 60.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 62-63.
78 See Fraser, supra note 35, at 160-61.
79 For a caveat, see id. at 163 (pointing out that an "overheard" threat that applies to the
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Therefore, a proper linguistic classification of the illocutionary act
performed in a Tarasoff context would be a "pledge," a type of
"commissive," since the speaker commits himself to harm a third party."1
Just as with implicature, the relevance of speech acts in the Tarasoff
context is that illocutionary acts can be made in indirect ways. Again,
these utterances are no less explicit for that fact. Searle noted that indirect
speech acts are made when the syntactic form of the locution fits one
classification but carries the illocutionary force of another.12 For example,
if all of the felicity conditions for a "pledge to harm" are present, the
illocutionary force of the conmissive "I'll kill him" can take the syntactic
form of all of the other classes:
Representative: "He deserves to die." or "He's going to
wind up getting himself killed."
Expressive: "I worry that I'm going to kill him."
Question: "Why should someone like him get to live?"
Directive: (To a picture of the intended victim) "Die!
Die!"
Declaration: "He's dead." (i.e., "He's as good as dead.").
Note that the above utterances retain all of the semantic power of the
cornmissive threat/pledge, and they all trigger a duty to warn under every
iteration of that rule, whether statutory or common law.83 In normal
contexts, these utterances might be considered somewhat ambiguous, and a
hearer might be exonerated for doubting their sincerity. But in a Tarasoff
context, with a therapist whose professional standards require the
acquisition of information as well as its proper assessment, these types of
utterances pose hard problems. It is crucial to know whether-at the level
81 Arguably, the utterance "I'm going to kill X" can also be classified as a "report" or a
"claim"--the passing of information to the hearer, which would make it a "representative."
It could, depending upon the intention of the speaker, also be meant as a "plea," with the
speaker hoping to be stopped-"I'm afraid I'm going to kill X'---and therefore a type of
"directive." This seems to be the case in Little v. All Phoenix S. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr.,
Inc., 919 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (speaker requested hospitalization because
he feared he might harm his wife). Little's directive plea had the force of a commissive.
82 See John R. Searle, Indirect Speech Acts, in 3 SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS: SPEECH ACTS
59, 71 (Peter Cole & Jerry L. Morgan eds., 1975).
83 See infra Part III.
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of language-a pledge to harm was made. As will be shown below, 84 in
the Tarasoff context the felicity conditions are affected by jurisprudential
influences and depend upon a clear understanding of what criteria relate to
each.
This is particularly so because of another pragmatic feature of speech
acts, one that the unique workings of the law has made peculiar to the
Tarasoff context. This peculiarity exists because the locutionary act (the
particular utterance) and the illocutionary act (the particular force of that
utterance) are both distinct from the perlocutionary effect (the effect that
the utterance has on the hearer-fear, compassion, pity, joy, etc.). 85 In a
Tarasoff context, the commissive threat/pledge has not only the
perlocutionary effect of alarm on the therapist/hearer (much akin to a
physician who sees something in an X-ray that he does not like and must
alert the endangered party),86 but the commissive also has the
perlocutionary effect akin to that which would accompany the utterance of
a "declaration." For example, if the Queen places a sword upon a kneeling
subject's shoulder and utters the words "I dub thee Lord Henry," the words
and gestures change the status of the subject from commoner to knight.
Similarly, in the Tarasoff context, when the Speaker/Patient communicates
a pledge to harn--"I'm going to kill X"--the law makes the utterance of
the commissive have the perlocutionary effect of a declaration: the duty of
privilege to the patient is destroyed and replaced with a duty to warn the
intended victim. 87 In effect, just as the commoner becomes a knight, the
hearer/therapist who owes his patient confidentiality becomes, for purposes
of the rule, a citizen who owes his fellow citizen a warning. Indeed, from
the law's standpoint, the effect on the hearer is of supreme importance,
because in a duty to warn lawsuit, the accusation is that the hearer/
therapist should have been alarmed and, consequently, warned the intended
victim.8 8 From the law's standpoint, in a strict sense, whether the speaker
84 See infra Part IV.
85 AuSTIN, supra note 45, at 101-03.
86 This is another reason why the utterance is not a "threat" in the Tarasoff context.
Instead of fear, the perlocutionary effect is "alarm for another's safety," or "alarm that a
duty must be discharged."
87 Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 346-47 (Cal. 1976).
88 Id. at 345.
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actually intends the harm is irrelevant.89 If a reasonable therapist, knowing
what he should know according to professional standards, would consider
the pledge "real," then he must warn.90 If he is reasonable, according to
the standard proposed in the final section below, he should be exonerated
from a suit for breach of privilege, even if the patient swears up and down
that he "did not mean it" or "was not capable of it."9'
2. Implied Locutions and Non-literal Locutions
To further illustrate the variability by which meanings can be
conveyed, two other dimensions of speech acts are relevant: implied
locutions and non-literal locutions. As evidenced by their names, both are
less than direct ways of communicating, and both can be used to express a
threat/pledge. An implied locution is one in which the propositional
content of the utterance is not expressed, but implied via implicature.92 For
example, in the utterance, "I'll bet that Bill's chest can't repel bullets," the
speaker seems to be making a "bet," a type of commissive. However,
because the speaker is not making a serious wager as to Bill's ability to
withstand gunfire, the hearer infers that this talk of "bullets" is irrelevant
(the speaker is flouting the maxim of relation) and that the speaker actually
intends to harm Bill. Though the locutionary act is implied, the pledge to
harm is as real as if it were explicit.
93
Some locutions flout the maxim of quality, stating in the utterance
something that is obviously not the case. Such locutions are commonly
known in the field as "non-literal locutions." An example is: "If Bill wants
to die, he can just keep on bothering me." 94 Presumably, Bill does not
want to die, and the implicature is that the speaker intends to kill him,
89 Id. at 346.
90 Id. at 347.
91 The classic example of perlocutionary effect is that of Austin. The imperative "Shoot
her!" may have the illocutionary effect of an order, but it may also have the perlocutionary
effect of persuading the hearer to shoot her. AusTIN, supra note 45, at 101-02; see also
LEVINSON, supra note 39, at 236-37; Nobuhiko Yamanaka, On Indirect Threats, 8 INT'L J.
SEMIOTICS L. 37, 50-52 (1995).
92 See Grice, supra note 48, at 43-44.
93 See id. at 49-50. The examples above in the section on "Implicature" are all implied
locutions; instead of answering the yes-no interrogatives, the answers are representatives or
expressives with a missing propositional content condition. See discussion supra Part II.A.
94 See Grice, supra note 48, at 46, 49, 53.
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conditional upon the persistence of his pestering ways. Again, though the
utterance is indirect, it is no less real, and would have no lighter
consequences in a Tarasoffcontext.95
There are other ways to use indirectness in locutions: through passivity
of voice ("a match will be thrown... "), through imprecise pronoun
reference ("they will be hurt"), through semantic ambiguity ("I'm going to
get him"),96 to name a few. Even the categories set out above are capable
of overlapping with each other.97 More than one maxim can be flouted in
any locution, and a syntactic form might give rise to more than one
illocutionary act.98 In addition, a threat/pledge raises other problems,
because it is often placed in the conditional mode: "If you don't pay me by
the end of the month, I'll break your legs." 99  Some legislators have
foreseen the difficulty that a conditional threat/pledge poses, as will be
discussed in the next section, and have required "imminence" in a Tarasoff
context before a duty to warn arises. 00 But as has been shown, a locution
may imply something entirely different from the way it is phrased-a
question in form might be a directive in force (e.g., "Could you turn down
your radio?"). Similarly, a statement may contain a conditional form, but
the condition may turn the threat into a "warning.
910
3. "Warnings" and "Threats"
A distinction between "warnings" and "threats" is a difficult one to
make, even for linguists, and much time has been spent arguing for discrete
95 See People v. Toledo, 26 P.3d 1051, 1057-58 (Cal. 2001) (discussing attempted
criminal threats). In that case, a non-literal locution was uttered as a threat: "You don't
want to die tonight, do you?" Id. at 1053.
96 For an example, see Holt v. United States, 565 A.2d 970, 972 (D.C. 1989) (involving
the threat "I'm gonna get you .... ").
97 For example, a promise can have the force of both a pledge to another and a reminder
to the self: "I promise I'll get to work on time tomorrow."
98 For examples, see supra Part II.A.
99 Yamanaka calls these "negotiation" threats. Yamanaka, supra note 91, at 46-47.
E.g., "If you give us compensation, we want to put an end (to slandering)." Id.
100 California, whose supreme court decided Tarasoff, does not have an imminence
dimension to its statute. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007).
101 A conditional threat is always direct. See Phillip Chong Ho Shon, "I'd Grab the S-O-
B by His Hair and Yank Him Out the Window": The Fraternal Order of Warning and
Threats in Police-Citizen Encounters, 16 DISCOURSE & Soc'Y 829, 832 (2005).
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definitions. The simplest distinction is that, like a "promise," the speaker
intends something for the benefit of the hearer in a "warning," whereas in a
"threat" the speaker intends something detrimental to the hearer (and
correspondingly, to the victim in the threat/pledge).10 2 However, it seems
that in a threat/pledge, both the consequence of non-compliance, as well as
the compliance itself, are detrimental to the hearer (e.g., "If you don't leave
her alone," which hearer doesn't want to do-"I'll break your legs"-
which hearer doesn't want to experience). On the other hand, in the
warning, only the consequence is detrimental ("I warn you that cigarettes
will be your death."). With a warning, only the non-compliance is bad:
death. The compliance-the implied directive to stop smoking and live, is
a good thing for the hearer. In any event, a major difference between a
warning and a conditional pledge is that the hearer in a Tarasoff context is
not the endangered party. In addition, the victim, on whom the condition is
imposed, cannot comply because he does not know of the condition-as he
is not present (i.e., he can only know if the therapist warns). In a Tarasoff
context, as will be discussed below, the existence of a condition should not
affect a triggering of the duty itself, but only the factor of imminence.
10 3
In sum, a threat/pledge may be made directly, upon which any
applicable Tarasoff duty may arise. But as has been shown, a pledge may
102 Fraser, supra note 35, at 166. Threats and warnings are the subject of much linguistic
interest. See, e.g., Yamanaka, supra note 99, at 46 (A statement "referring to the fact that
an action has not been performed yet can be taken as an indirect assertion that it will occur
sooner or later."); Peter Gingiss, Indirect Threats, 37 WoRD 153, 153 (1986) (noting that a
distinction should be made between threats and warnings ("indirect threats") as the former
are illegal); Kate Story, The Language of Threats, 2 FORENsic LINGUISTIcs 74, 74 (1995)
(positing that warnings are "socially indispensable," while threats are "illegal").
103 See discussion infra Part VI. Although felicitous "warnings" are beyond the scope of
this article, the sufficiency of the warning given was mentioned in Emerich v. Philadelphia
Ctr. for Human Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1045 (Pa. 1998). There, the victim's family
claimed that the mental health professional's warning was insufficient, given the victim's
own mental impairment. Id. at 1045 n. 15. The court did not dispose of the issue as there
were no facts alleged in the complaint to such an effect. Id. at 1044. However, an
argument over the recognizability of the warning qua warning would be an argument
challenging the existence of the essential condition for a felicitous warning. That is, the
victim's family in Emerich was suggesting that the doctor failed to put the warning in a
form that would make it recognizable, especially considering the diminished capacities of
the victim. Id. at 1044 n. 15.
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be made through implication, or indirection, or by non-literal means.'
4
Whether a Tarasoff duty arises in that instance depends upon the degree to
which the law in question comports with linguistic reality.
III. DuTY TO WARN LAWS
The facts of Tarasoff are well-rehearsed by now, and only a brief
recitation will suffice for the purposes here. In the case, the patient made a
direct threat/pledge to his therapist against the victim. 0 5  The therapist
tried to have the patient committed, but the patient was released.1
0 6
Ultimately, the patient killed the victim. 10 7 The California Supreme Court
imposed the duty based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 315,
which suggests that those who have had a special relationship with a third
party owe a duty of care to those injured by that third party.'0 8 The
therapist and the patient were said to have such a special relationship, and
thus the affirmative duty was imposed.10 9 An understanding of the genesis
104 See discussion supra Part II.
105 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 554 (Cal. 1974), vacated, 551
P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). Of interest in the Tarasoff facts is that the locution that triggered the
duty was uttered while the victim was out of the country. Id. at 556. The patient attacked
the victim two months after uttering the locution. Id. at 554. Questions of the threat's
imminence, though not raised, would have been germane to the analysis under a rule that
included such a feature. Some state legislatures have recognized the importance of
imminence. See ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.200(a)(3) (2006) ("immediate threat... to an
identifiable victim"); FLA. STAT. § 491.0147(3) (2001) ("clear and immediate probability of
physical harm"); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 110/1 l(ii) (2002 & Supp. 2008) ("imminent
risk of serious" harm); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 611.004(a)(2) (Vernon 2003
& Supp. 2008) ("probability of imminent.., or... immediate" injury); W. VA. CODE § 27-
3-1(b)(5) (Supp. 2008); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-38-113(a)(iv) (2007) (disclosure of "an
immediate threat of physical violence").
106 TarasoffI, 529 P.2d at 554.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 557-58 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).
'°9Id, at 558, 561. This basis of liability is often the turning point on a court's
acceptance or rejection of the duty. Compare Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. for Human
Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1043-44 (Pa. 1998) (finding a special relationship) with Nasser
v. Parker, 455 S.E.2d 502, 506 (Va. 1995) (finding no special relationship). See also Peter
Lake, Virginia is Not Safe for "Lovers ": The Virginia Supreme Court Rejects Tarasoff in
Nasser v. Parker, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1285, 1285-86 (1995) (noting that Nasser "represents
the first time any court of last resort has squarely rejected" Tarasoff) (footnotes omitted).
2008]
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
of the rule is crucial to understanding its potential consequences, which
will be discussed below in Part IV. Such considerations will follow an
analysis of the rules themselves." 0
In the wake of Tarasoff, legislatures passed statutes and courts adopted
rules that sought to draw parameters around the duty that a health care
110 Only rules that impose a mandatory duty to warn are analyzed here; discretionary
duties, by the very fact that they are discretionary, weaken liability claims and hence are not
generative of the type of situations in which parsing of the language used in the incident is
of real consequence. Therefore, states with discretionary duties are beyond the scope of this
article. These states include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.200(a)(3) (2006); Connecticut,
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 52-146c(c)(3) (2005) (psychologists); id. § 52-146f(2) (psychiatrists);
District of Columbia, D.C. CODE § 7-1203.03(a) (2008 & Supp. 2008); Florida, FLA. STAT.
§ 491.0147(3) (2001); Illinois, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 110/1 (ii) (2002 & Supp.
2008); New York, N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33:13(c)(6) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2008);
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 179.505(12) (2007); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37.3-
4(b)(4) (2004 & Supp. 2007); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 611.004(a)(2)
(Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008); West Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 27-3-1(b)(5) (Supp. 2008);
and Wyoming, WYo. STAT. AN. § 33-38-113(a)(iv) (2007). The rule in Minnesota looks
both ways: it imposes a duty to warn, MINN. STAT. § 148.975(2) (2005), but also allows for
discretionary disclosures made in good faith. Id. § 148.975(7). States with no duty to warn
include Alabama, but see Morton v. Prescott, 564 So. 2d 913, 916 (Ala. 1990) (leaning
toward Tarasoff duty if plaintiff can show the defendant made a "specific threat of harm to
the victim or to any identifiable group of which the victim might have been a member");
Georgia, but see Bradley Ctr., Inc. v. Wessner, 296 S.E.2d 693, 695-96 (Ga. 1982)
(recognizing duty to control; leaning toward duty to warn); Hawaii, but see Lee v.
Corregedore, 925 P.2d 324, 333 (Haw. 1996) (leaning toward a Tarasoff duty though not
extending Tarasoff to include situations where there is no risk of bodily harm to third
persons); Iowa, compare Anthony v. State, 374 N.W.2d 662, 668 (Iowa 1985) (leaning
toward Tarasoff duty) with Cole v. Taylor, 301 N.W.2d 766, 768 (Iowa 1981) ("We have
not adopted the rationale in Tarasoff."); New Mexico, but see Wilschinsky v. Medina, 775
P.2d 713, 715 (N.M. 1989) (stating law unsettled); see also Weitz v. Lovelace Health Sys.,
Inc., 214 F.3d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (repeating that "New Mexico has noted that
many courts recognize 'a duty to warn when a specific, identifiable third party [victim] was
known to the doctor,' although it does not appear that the state has resolved this question
for itself" (citation omitted)); North Carolina, but see Currie v. United States., 836 F.2d
209, 213 (4th Cir. 1987) (implying that North Carolina would recognize a Tarasoff duty to
warn). Arkansas, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, North Dakota and South Dakota do not have
statutory or common law rules that address the duty to warn.
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professional owes to those who are not his patients. 1 ' Basically, the rules
require that the therapist make some kind of warning or attempt to protect
a third party when the therapist's patient communicates "a serious threat of
physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims.,
' ' 2
The variables among the duties imposed include whether the duty is
discretionary or mandatory;" 3 whether the duty arises only from explicit
threats or from other criteria as well; 14 whether a therapist must report
threats communicated by third parties or only those threats communicated
by the patient;"' whether the threat includes self-directed harm" 16 or threats
against real property;" 7 whether the intended victim must be "clearly"
identifiable or only "reasonably" identifiable;" 8 from whom the duty is
owed;" 9 and how the duty can be discharged.
20
111 See, e.g., supra the statutes and case decisions listed in note 110.
112 E.g., CAL. CIw. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007). The identifiability of the victim was
first prominently discussed in Thompson v. County ofAlameda, 614 P.2d 728, 735-36 (Cal.
1980) (determining public employees have no affirmative duty to warn about the
nonspecific threats made by a released inmate).
13 See supra the discussion in note I 10.
"4 E.g., IND. CODE § 34-30-16-1 (1999) (allowing conduct or statements other than
explicit threats to trigger duty); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-609(b) (LexisNexis
2006) (allowing "speech, conduct, or writing" to trigger duty); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 123,
§ 36B(1) (2003) (triggering the duty when there is a history of physical violence and "a
reasonable basis to believe" serious bodily injury against a specific victim will imminently
occur); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16(b) (West 2000) (allowing circumstances to establish
the threat that triggers the duty).
"' E.g., MINN. STAT. § 148.975(2) (2005) (allowing the duty to arise where "other
person[s]" communicate the threat); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2305.51(B) (LexisNexis
2005) (allowing the duty to arise where "a knowledgeable person has communicated.., an
explicit threat"); Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
116 E.g., MINN. STAT. § 148.975(7) (2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 1376(3)(a) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
"'E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.31(I) (2003) (psychiatrists); id. § 330-A:35(I)
(psychologists); see Peck v. Counseling Serv. of Addison County, Inc., 499 A.2d 422, 427
(Vt. 1985).
18See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02 (2003) ("clearly"); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 43.92(a) (West 2007) ("reasonably"); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 5402(a)(1) (2003)
("clearly"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1902 (2004) ("clearly"); IND. CODE § 34-30-16-1 (1999)
("reasonably"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2(A) (Supp. 2008) ("clearly"); MAss. GEN.
LAWS, ch. 123, § 36B(1) (2003) ("reasonably"); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 330.1946(1) (1999)
(continued)
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("reasonably"); MINN. STAT. § 148.975(2) (2005) ("clearly"); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-21-
97(e) (2005) ("clearly identified or reasonably identifiable"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-3132(1)
(2007) ("reasonably"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.31(I) (2003) ("clearly identified or
reasonably identifiable"); id. § 330-A:35(I) ("clearly identified or reasonably identifiable");
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000) ("readily identifiable"); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 2305.51(B) (LexisNexis 2005) ("clearly"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 1376(3)(b) (2000 &
Supp. 2007) ("reasonably identifiable"); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 33-3-206(1) (2007)
("clearly"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-502(1) (2002) ("clearly identified or reasonably
identifiable"); WASH. REV. CODE. § 71.05.120(2) (2008) ("reasonably"); Bradley v. Ray,
904 S.W.2d 302, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("readily identifiable). "Clearly" and
"identifiable" are not the only standards used. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (2008)
("specific person or persons"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-609(b) (LexisNexis
2006) ("specified victim or group of victims"); Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. for Human
Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1040 (Pa. 1998) (just states "intended victim"); Bishop v. South
Carolina Dept. of Mental Health, 502 S.E.2d 78, 81 (S.C. 1998) (just states "potential
victim"); Peck, 499 A.2d at 427 (just states "identifiable victim"). Wisconsin has no
requirement for an identifiable target. See Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 166
(Wis. 1988) (duty to warn arises when necessary for the protection of the public).
119 Some states impose a duty upon some variant of the defined term "mental health
professional." ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02 (2003) ("mental health provider");
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (2008) ("mental health professional"); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit.
16, § 5402(a)(1) (2003) ("mental health services provider"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1902
(2004) ("mental health professional"); IND. CODE § 34-30-16-1 (1999) ("provider of mental
health services"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400(l) (West 2006) ("mental health
professional"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-609(b) (LexisNexis 2006) ("mental
health care provider"); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 123, § 36B(1) (2003) ("mental health
professional"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1946(1) (1999) ("mental health professional");
OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2305.5 1(B) (LexisNexis 2005) ("mental health professional or
mental health organization"); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 33-3-206(1) (2007) ("mental health
professional or behavior analyst"); Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 312 ("psychologist or other
health care professional"); Emerich, 720 A.2d at 1040 ("mental health professional"); Peck,
499 A.2d at 427 ("mental health professional").
Other states impose the duty upon some variant of psychotherapists/psychologists/
psychiatrists. CAL. Civ. CODE § 43.92 (West 2007) ("psychotherapist"); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 38-3132(1) (2007) ("psychologist"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.31(I) (2003)
("psychiatrists"); id. § 330-A:35(I) ("psychologists"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 1376(3)(b)
(2000 & Supp. 2007) ("psychologist"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-502 (1) (2002)




But from the linguistic approach being applied here, the relevant parts
of the rules are those that relate to the pragmatic features outlined above,
i.e., those that track the reality that is taking place at the level of the
language in a Tarasoff context. The statutes and their common law
counterparts tie the duty to the occurrence of an event: a speech act, verbal
or non-verbal, that amounts to some kind of threat/pledge. 12 1 In well-
drawn rules, all dimensions of the speech event that trigger the duty are as
transparent as possible. That is, the best rules are those that most closely
track that reality, and comport with it by observing the permutations that
can occur through implication, indirection, etc. As with the perlocutionary
effect of threats/pledges (a commissive that the law gives the effect of a
declaration)--while the law can add dimensions to the linguistic reality, it
should not ignore or deny its key aspects.
A. Four Linguistic Dimensions of Duties to Warn
As stated above, Bruce Fraser sets out the criteria for a felicitous
threat:
Some states impose the duty on psychotherapists as well as marriage and family
therapists, licensed professional counselors and social workers. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800.2(A) (Supp. 2008) ("psychologist or psychiatrist, or board-certified social
worker"); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-21-97(e) (2005) ("physicians, psychologists... or
licensed master social workers").
Other states impose the duty on defined licensees and licensed practitioners. MINN.
STAT. § 148.975 (2005) ("licensee"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000) ("licensed
practitioner").
South Carolina imposes the duty on an individual who "has the ability to monitor,
supervise, and control an individual's conduct" because it gives rise to a "special
relationship." Bishop, 502 S.E.2d at 81.
The state of Washington statute lists a large group of persons: "officer of a public or
private agency, . . . the superintendent, professional person in charge, his or her professional
designee, or attending staff of any such agency,... any public official performing functions
necessary to the administration of this chapter,... peace officer responsible for detaining a
person pursuant to this chapter.... any county designated mental health professional."
WASH. REv. CODE. § 71.05.120(1) (2008).
120 E.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007) ("warn of and protect").
121 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-609(b) (LexisNexis 2006) (duty to
warn arises where the patient indicates an intention to harm "by speech, conduct, or
writing ... ").
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a. The speaker's expressed intention to commit an act or to
have it committed;
b. The speaker's belief that the act will be unfavorable to
the hearer;
c. The speaker's intention to intimidate the hearer through
the hearer's awareness of speaker's intention.
122
By way of comparison, these requirements are helpful in establishing the
criteria for a felicitous pledge to harm in a Tarasoff context. For in order
to relate that pledge to harm, the speaker must also express an intention to
commit an act or to have it committed. However, the act committed must
be unfavorable to a third party, the intended victim, not the hearer. There
is no intention to intimidate the hearer in the Tarasoff threat/pledge. In
addition, Tarasoff duties add certain dimensions to limit or expand the
context. Typically, those dimensions include requirements that:
1. The harm be "physical" or "serious" or some other
expression to ensure "gravity," which would not be part of
an ordinary "pledge."'
123
2. The threat be "sincere" or that there be some real
"apparent intent" to perform the harm, to ensure
earnestness. 24  This would be a part of the ordinary
pledge, fulfilling its sincerity condition.
3. The speaker be capable of performing the stated
harm.125 This too would be part of an ordinary pledge.
4. The danger be imminent, whereas the temporal
implication for an ordinary pledge would characteristically
be for a duration of time, even for a lifetime (e.g., "I
pledge allegiance. .. .,,).126
122 See supra text accompanying notes 68-70.
123 See statutes cited infra note 144.
124 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1902 (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2(A)
(Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1946(1) (1999).
125 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 1376(3)(b) (2000 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE. ANN.
§ 33-3-206(1) (2007).
126 See sources cited infra note 136.
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Some rules also require that the "threat" be "explicit,"'127 but as has been
seen, threats can be made indirectly and still be explicit.
128
B. A Statutory Example: The Arizona Duty to Warn Law
A rule typical of those that "front" all aspects of the felicity conditions,
making them requirements, is that of Arizona:
There shall be no cause of action against a mental health
provider nor shall legal liability be imposed for breaching
a duty to prevent harm to a person caused by a patient,
unless both of the following occur:
1. The patient has communicated to the mental health
provider an explicit threat of imminent serious physical
harm or death to a clearly identified or identifiable victim
or victims, and the patient has the apparent intent and
ability to carry out such threat.
2. The mental health provider fails to take reasonable
precautions. 129
This statute anticipates sincerity ("apparent intent"), capability (apparent
ability-although it is ambiguous whether the word "apparent" modifies
both "ability" and "intent"), gravity ("physical harm or death"), and
imminence. Finally, the victim must be "clearly" identifiable, not only
reasonably so. What the statute leaves in question is whether by "explicit"
the legislators mean to disqualify non-verbal threats, or those gleaned from
the circumstances.
30
Regardless, indirect threats, as explained above, are verbal, and should
still trigger the duty. Legislators and courts that comfort themselves with
requirements for "specific threats" ignore the linguistic reality of explicit
dangers being communicated through indirection or implication.
127 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02 (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1902
(2004); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2305.51(B) (LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59
§ 1376(3)(b) (2000 & Supp. 2007).
128 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
129 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02(A) (2003), invalidated by Little v. All Phoenix S.
Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 919 P.2d 1368, 1370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
130 There is no legislative history on this matter.
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The condition of "sincerity" is covered in various ways. Some rules
use the term "apparent intent" (as does Arizona above) to cover that
13 ,, ,32aspect.'3  The word "serious" may also be read to cover "sincerity, ' 1 as
may the term "actual."' 133 Of all the conditions, sincerity's coverage is the
most fluidly expressed, and not all rules include it,134 perhaps due to the lay
assumption that for a threat/pledge to be a threat/pledge, it must be
sincerely meant. In other words, lay people would argue that "sincerity" is
part of what a "threat" is. But then, the same argument could be made
against the necessity of terms to ensure gravity, or imminence, or
capability, etc.-i.e., "Everyone knows" that a 'real' threat is only one in
which the person means to hurt you physically, and soon," etc. This
"everyone knows" assumption only begs the question as to what the
felicity conditions for a threat/pledge really are. 135 It also underscores the
necessity of clear thinking and the consultation of linguistic analysis to
determine that point. Otherwise, the statutory rule will not anticipate all
possible objections to its clarity or application.
Another troublesome condition is that of "imminence." While the term
is included in many iterations, 136 it is covered by "clear and present
danger" in Massachusetts and Oklahoma, and in those rules only if the
131 See supra note 124.
132 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007). In Arizona, it seems the term
"serious" is meant to modify physical harm, in the sense of "grave."
13 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 34-30-16-1 (1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400(1) (West
2006); Miss. CODE. ANN. § 41-21-97(e) (2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1102 (2007);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-502 (1) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE. § 71.05.120(2) (2008).
'34 See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 33-38-113(a)(iv) (2007).
135 Cf Ewing v. Northridge, Hosp. Med. Ctr., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 597-99 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004) (discussing the difficulty in predicting a patient's tendencies pursuant to
standards of the profession).
136 Many states simply use "imminent" or "immediate." See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-
117 (2008) ("imminent"); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 5402(a)(1) (2003) ("imminent");
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1902 (2004) ("imminent"); IND. CODE § 34-30-16-1 (1999)
("imminent"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-609(b) (LexisNexis 2006)
("imminent"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000) ("imminent"); OHIo REV. CODE.
ANN. § 2305.5 1(B) (LexisNexis 2005) ("imminent"); Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. for




threat is circumstantial. 37 In thirteen states, the condition is not included
at all.138 The difficulty here is that, like the condition of sincerity, which
overcomes the objection that the patient was "just kidding" (and therefore
not pledging to harm anyone "in reality"), "imminence" as a condition
overcomes the objection that the harm intended was not "immediate," and
therefore required no warning. It is one of the things essential to a
threat/pledge being recognizable as such. 13 9  Likewise, the speaker's
capability to inflict the stated harm, while essential for a threat/pledge to be
understood as a threat/pledge, has only found its way into the iterations of
nine of the twenty-seven rules.
140
A point might be anticipated: a hearer might say he did not think a
threat was "serious," meaning "sincere," because it was not immediate, or
because the speaker was incapable of carrying out the threat due to some
physical or geographic limitation. Such a statement implies that
"sincerity" is the overarching condition to all Tarasoff threats/pledges; in
other words, all other aspects are entailed within that term. But such a
137 MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 123, § 36B(1) (2003) ("clear and present danger" where there
is "a history of physical violence"); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 1376(3)(b) (2000 & Supp. 2007)
("clear and present danger" standard where patient presents a "danger to himself').
138 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007); MINN. STAT. § 148.975(2) (2005); Miss.
CODE. AN. § 41-21-97(e) (2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1102 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 38-3132(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329:31(I) (2003); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 33-3-
206(1) (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-502 (1) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE. § 71.05.120
(2008); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Bishop v. South
Carolina Dept. of Mental Health, 502 S.E.2d 78, 81 (S.C. 1998); Peck v. Counseling Serv.
of Addison County, Inc., 499 A.2d 422, 427 (Vt. 1985); Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d
159, 166 (Wis. 1988).
139 Interestingly, the California legislature changed its statute from actual to serious
threats to make sure to include any conditional threats; however, it did not recognize any
temporal requirement by including imminence as an element. See Ewing v. Goldstein, 15
Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (referencing Hearing before the Assembly
Comm. on Judiciary, 1985-86 Reg. Sess. at 4 (1985) (Analysis of Assembly Bill No.
1133)).
140 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02(A) (2003); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5402(a)(1) (2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1902 (2004); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800.2(A) (Supp. 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 123, § 36B(l) (2003); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 330.1946(1) (1999); OHio REV. CODE. ANN. § 2305.51(B) (LexisNexis 2005);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 1376(3)(b) (2000 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE. ANN. § 33-3-206(1)
(2007).
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point is merely academic, as what exactly made the threat/pledge seem
"insincere" in a given situation would still require a determination of
imminence, or capability, etc. That is, it is a distinction without a
difference to claim that the speaker was "incapable" of the harm, as
opposed to claiming the speaker was insincere because he seemed
incapable.
Of all the statutory conditions, "gravity" is the least linguistically
related. An ordinary pledge does not anticipate harm, let alone physical
harm or death. 14 However, the counterpart to gravity in a normal pledge is
that a pledge is generally meant to imply "solemnity"'142 (e.g., a "pledge of
allegiance," or a "pledge of honor," etc.). Here the law requires that the
pledge be of a certain type, i.e., harmful, for the duty to be triggered-
which is owing to its understanding of the term "threat." A threat, by
common understanding, intends harm towards the addressee. 43 As has
been shown, the Tarasoff context does not actually concern "threats," since
the intended victim is absent, but rather concerns "pledges" or "reports."
Still, this residue of "harm," which is within the semantic field surrounding
the term "threat," is anticipated in the rules. Hence this article's use of the
specific term "pledge" is meant to connote a "pledge to harm," rather than
simply "pledge." Gravity, as a condition, is included in most rules.44
141 Fraser, supra note 35, at 164.
142 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1049-50 (3d ed. 2006).
143 Fraser, supra note 35, at 160; see also supra note 78 and accompanying text.
'44 See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-517.02(A) (2003) ("physical harm"); CAL. Civ.
CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007) ("physical violence"); COL. REV. STAT. § 13-12-117 (2008)
("physical violence"); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 5402(a)(1) (2003) ("kill or seriously
injure"); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1902 (2004) ("physical harm or death"); IND. CODE § 34-
30-16-1 (1999) ("physical violence or other means of harm"); KY. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 202A.400(1) (West 2006) ("physical violence"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.2(A)
(Supp. 2008) ("physical violence"); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PRO. § 5-609(b)
(LexisNexis 2006) ("physical injury"); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 123, § 36B(l) (2003) ("kill
or inflict serious bodily injury"); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 330.1946(1) (1999) ("physical
violence"); MINN. STAT. § 148.975(2) (2005) ("physical violence"); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 41-
21-97 (2005) ("physical violence"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-1102 (2007) ("physical
violence"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 38-3132(1) (2007) ("physical violence"); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 329.31(I) (2003) ("physical violence or substantial damage to real property"); id.
§ 330-A:35(I); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000) ("physical violence"); OHIO REV.




However the rules are iterated, it must be restated that it is whether the
hearer should have understood the speaker to be making a "threat" that
triggers the duty. It is the perception of the hearer, not the expression or
belief of the speaker, that is the focus for determining liability. Just as the
states have adopted and iterated their rules in various ways, fronting some
or all conditions, ignoring others at the cost of conflicting with linguistic
reality, the courts have variously interpreted those rules. Judicial
expression of clear factors for determination of any given requirement-
sincerity, capability, imminence, gravity-are practically non-existent.145
Perhaps most troublesome of all, a vague understanding of the type of duty
required, and from whence the duty springs, has contributed to a pernicious
possibility within the enterprise of the affirmative duty. 146
IV. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF DUTIES TO WARN
A. Lack of a Proper Framework
Judicial parsing of duty to warn rules has at best demonstrated only a
muddled appreciation of the importance of the terms involved in a
felicitous threat/pledge-sincerity, imminence, capability, and gravity.
While precedent in the area of language crimes, such as criminal threats,
extortion, bribery, etc. has looked to linguistic expertise for explanation of
59 § 1376(3)(b) (2000 & Supp. 2007) ("kill or inflict serious bodily injury"); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78B-3-502 (1) (2002) ("physical violence"); WASH. REV. CODE. § 71.05.120 (2008)
("physical violence"); Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. for Human Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032,
1039-40 (Pa. 1998) ("lethal harm"); Peck v. Counseling Serv. of Addison County, Inc., 499
A.2d 422, 427 (Vt. 1985) ("serious risk of danger"). Neither Missouri nor South Carolina
defines the type of violence. See Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 312 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995)
("future violence"); Bishop v. South Carolina Dept. of Mental Health, 502 S.E.2d 78, 81
(S.C. 1998) ("dangerous conduct"). Tennessee only mentions "bodily harm." TENN. CODE.
ANN. § 33-3-206(1) (2007).
145 See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976); Bradley,
904 S.W.2d 302; Emerich, 720 A.2d 1032; Bishop, 502 S.E.2d 78.
146 Duty to warn laws are impacted by other legislation, such as information privacy
laws. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2008). A possible objection to a duty to warn could be
anticipated in jurisdictions in which a "Megan's Law" is in place. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:7-1 to -19 (West 2000). It is possible that a therapist-who had heard a threat/pledge
stated by a listed sex offender-might argue that the community was already on warning,
thereby making the duty moot.
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what is happening at the level of language, 147 the law of civil liability, to
which Tarasoff duties pertain, makes no such consultation. Most cases in
the area that impose the duty skip over this initial enquiry-whether a
"threat" was understood by the therapist at all-to conclude that a
reasonable therapist would have protected or warned the intended victim
given the evidence.14
But that evidence, according to the rules as written, is only pertinent to
whether the doctor should have understood that a felicitous "threat" was
communicated. 149 In other words, courts fail to attach liability to what the
defendant should have understood from the speech act, which is what
triggers the obligation under all duty to warn rules. This is perhaps due to
confusion about where "foreseeability" should come into play, a general
tort standard that weaves in and out of judicial rationales. 150  But
foreseeability is only another way of saying that, given the evidence of
what the therapist knew of his patient, he should have understood the
circumstance to pose a threat/pledge, and he should have acted according
to what the rule requires of him.
Of the twenty-seven non-discretionary rules, only four do not predicate
the liability upon some "communication" of a threat/pledge,' 5 ' which
makes the enquiry of whether the speech act occurred their common
catalytic feature. Given the circumstances, and what the therapist knew or
should have known of his patient (depending upon the rule's iteration), all
evidence should be marshaled towards a determination of whether the
147 See sources cited supra note 33; see also JOHN GIBBONS, FORENSIC LINGUISTICS: AN
INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM (Blackwell Publishing, Ltd.
Publishers, Inc. 2003) (1993); LAWRENCE M. SLOAN & PETER M. TiERSMA, SPEAKING OF
CRIME: THE LANGUAGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2005).
141 See Emerich, 720 A.2d at 1044; Bishop, 502 S.E.2d at 82; see also Bradley, 904
S.W.2d at 312 (allowing for liability where the therapist knew or should have known);
Peck, 499 A.2d, at 426 (same).
149 See statutes cited supra notes 136-40.
150 "Foreseeability" is the standard in those jurisdictions that allow proof by
"circumstances," such as Delaware, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts and New Jersey.
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 16, § 5402(a)(1) (2003); IND. CODE § 34-30-16-1 (1999); MD. CODE
ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-609(b) (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS, ch. 123,
§ 36B(1) (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000).
"' Bradley, 904 S.W.2d at 312; Bishop, 502 S.E.2d at 82; Peck, 499 A.2d, at 427;
Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 166 (Wis. 1988).
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therapist should have understood a threat to have been communicated.
Once more, that is what triggers the duty. For even in the jurisdictions
whose rules do not use the words "communicate," "speech," or some other
term, but rather predicate the liability on some kind of "foreseeability," the
distinction is without a difference. Evidence in any situation will pertain to
whether the therapist heard a threat or saw a composite of circumstances
that amount to a non-verbal threat/pledge (which is only another form of
communication). That is, questions as to whether the circumstances
betrayed a "sincere" or "imminent" or "grave" threat/pledge, or whether or
not the patient was "capable," must perforce determine the "foreseeability"
of threatened danger, just as they determine the felicity of the spoken
communication. To that end, factors for determining such conditions must
be articulated; those factors are sorely missing from case rationales.
B. Problems of Interpretation
A good portion of duty to warn cases dispense with the initial
linguistic enquiry because of a feature in the rules that requires specificity
of the intended victim.15 2 If the threat/pledge is not against either a clearly
or reasonably identifiable victim, the duty does not arise. Other cases,
however, skirt the determination of the four conditions altogether, fail to
elaborate upon which of the conditions is missing, or fail to elaborate upon
what evidence has been used to establish them.1 53  Even when a
determination is attempted, it is often circuitous. The courts grapple with
the issue, but lack the language to articulate what they are grappling with,
and in any event fail to tie the analysis to the speech event. The following
cases are representative.
152 See, e.g., Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 734 (Cal. 1980); Durapau
v. Jenkins, 656 So. 2d 1067, 1069 (La. Ct. App. 1995). An interesting twist to the
"identifiability of victim" occurred in Wisconsin, when a patient threatened an entire class
of people at a bar. State v. Agacki, 595 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). The court
held that the therapist's warning was permissible. Id. at 38.
153 See, e.g., Jenks v. Brown, 557 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (considering
only gravity); Little v. All Phoenix S. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 919 P.2d 1368, 1373-
74 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (failing to discuss sincerity and capability).
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1. A Case of a Non- Verbal Threat
Barry v. Turek14 involved a suit under California's Duty to Warn
statute brought against a therapist and a hospital by a staff member who
was molested by a patient. 55 The patient could not speak English, 56 and
the evidence considered by the court to determine whether or not the
therapist "should have known" the patient posed a "serious threat of
physical violence" against the victim 57 included the patient's diminutive
size, his past acts vis-A-vis the threatened class, the patient's response to
reprimands and therapy, and the consensus view of the threatened class as
to the patient's potential for danger. 58 But in finding that the evidence
would not have provided the therapist any indication that the patient would
act as he did, 5 9 the court fails to state what aspect of the statute was
missing, thereby ignoring the occurrence of the non-verbal threat. Instead,
the court states in blanket form that there was no "serious threat of physical
violence"' 60 --a clause that could include the conditions of both sincerity
and gravity. But it is arguable that by mentioning the patient's size in the
statement of facts, 161 the court was considering the aspect of capability,
including it in the determination of whether the threat was "serious," in the
sense of "real," rather than "serious," in the sense of "sincere." This
guessing-game illustrates the difficulty that courts have in classifying the
evidence within statutory requirements that are broad, vague, or
ambiguous. By contrast, had the court analyzed the non-verbal
threat/pledge in terms of the conditions necessary for the existence of a
threat/pledge, it would be clear in what way the communication failed to
satisfy. Did the patient's size defeat any reasonable perception of his
capability? Did the staff's indifferent opinion as to his "dangerousness,"
taken together with his offensive, though relatively minor, attempts to kiss
and touch them, make the non-verbal acts somehow less than what a
114 267 Cal. Rptr. 553 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
155 Id. at 553-54.
156 Id. at 553.
157 The court held that the plaintiff was identifiable. Id. at 555. The California statute
does not require capability or imminence. CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007).
's' Barry, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 553-56.
"9 Id. at 556.
1Id
161 Id. at 553.
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reasonable person would consider grave? Did his response to reprimand
affect how serious, in the sense of "sincere," the therapist took the "threat"
to be? It is unclear from the opinion what exactly about the situation failed
to establish the requisite "threat," though it is clear that the court is trying
to say that the doctor never received a communication of the threatening
nature that would trigger the duty.'
62
2. A Case of an "Expressive" Threat
In DeVasier v. James, 63 the therapist physician was sued by the estate
of his patient's victim for failing to comply with Kentucky's Duty to Warn
statute. 64 The statute reads:
No monetary liability and no cause of action shall arise
against any mental health professional for failing to
predict, warn of or take precautions to provide protection
from a patient's violent behavior, unless the patient has
communicated to the mental health professional an actual
threat of physical violence against a clearly identified or
reasonably identifiable victim, or unless the patient has
communicated to the mental health professional an actual
threat of some specific violent act.'
65
The evidence included the following:
The critical information communicated by Cissell [the
patient] to members of Dr. James's staff included his
patient history given to Intake Nurse, Gregory Howell, and
Licensed Clinical Social Worker, Hiro Tanamachi.
Howell testified that Cissell appeared as a man in crisis,
that he was non-responsive to questions about homicidal
and suicidal ideation, and that he was beating his legs with
his fist and had clenched teeth. Howell stated that he
concluded Cissell was the highest-level priority patient,
and he recorded on the intake form that Cissell was a
162 See id. at 554.
163 Nos. 2001-CA-000846-MR, 2001-CA-000922-MR, 2007 WL 78984 (Ky. Ct. App.
Jan. 12, 2007).
'64Id. at *2.
165 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.400(1) (West 2006).
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Level 3 priority, indicating the most serious. Tanamachi
testified that Cissell communicated to him that he had run
Crady [the victim] off the road in a car the previous week,
that he had cut Crady's throat with a knife the previous
day, that he felt he "could not help himself," and he asked
to be admitted to the hospital to get help. Cissell's patient
history, as communicated to Dr. James's staff by Cissell,
as a part of the regular and customary treatment of a
patient, was then communicated to Dr. James by the
staff.., in the treatment of patients.
166
Although the issue before the court was whether the communication of
these events to a third party, rather than directly to the therapist himself,
was sufficient to give rise to the duty, 167 the case is a classic example of the
types of things a patient presents in the form of verbal and non-verbal acts
that may sustain the felicity conditions for a threat/pledge. Under a
pragmatic analysis, evidence as to the patient's appearance, refusal to
respond, physical acts, history vis-A-vis the intended victim, request for
medical help, impressions of the staff, and the expressed locution-he
"could not help himself'-would amount to an indirect illocutionary act
and meet the gravity and sincerity conditions required by the Kentucky
statute. That is, in the response to the question about homicidal ideations,
the pledge to harm was being communicated in the form of an expressive,
rather than a commissive:
THERAPIST: "Do you intend to harm X?
PATIENT: "I can't help myself' (an expressive) rather than
"I'm going to kill X" (a commissive).
Had the statute required imminence and capability, those conditions might
be satisfied by the state of agitation (relating to imminence), and the
demographic attributes of the patient (relating to capability).
68
166 DeVasier, 2007 WL 78984, at *5 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
167 Id. at *4 (majority opinion). The court held liability did not arise in such situations.
Id.
168 See discussion infra Part VI.
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3. A Case Questioning "Specificity"
In Riley v. United Healthcare of Hardin, Inc.'69 a Kentucky hospital
was sued by the executrix of a victim who claimed a duty to warn had been
breached. 70 The court set out the evidence:
The Hospital records indicated that Sean [the patient] was
a disturbed young man and prone towards violence.
Records made on Sean's admission to the Hospital
indicated that he and his mother had frequent quarrels, and
"although he has not hit her, he has certainly thought about
it." In addition, Mary [the patient's mother and the victim]
presented the Hospital with lyrics to "songs" that Sean had
written, including references to lifeless bodies, death, and
killing. In his initial psychiatric evaluation of Sean, Dr.
Thomas Cassidy [the therapist] noted that "problems
related to increased irritability and anger have become
more and more evident with his mother" and noted that
sometimes Sean "feels like he wants to strike out." Sean
testified at his deposition that he told Hospital staff that if
he were forced to return to Mary's house, "he might do
something he would regret later."
During his stay at Lincoln Trial Hospital, Sean was
both uncooperative and defiant, attempting to escape on
two occasions and once succeeding in stealing a truck and
going shoplifting. He exhibited volatile behavior, stating
that he was going to hit his roommate and requesting a
room change. Later, the Hospital staff placed Sean in
seclusion because he was "threatening to go off."...
Prior to killing his mother, Sean had never
communicated any specific threats to harm her to anyone
in his family or to the professionals at Lincoln Trail
Hospital. 
171
From a linguistic standpoint, this last statement provokes a question: in
what way was a specific threat/pledge not made? What does the court
169 No. 97-5860, 1998 WL 598733 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 1998).
170 Id. at *1.
171 Id. at *2.
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mean by "specific threat"? 17 2 The court held that the intended victim was
not clear, and that at any rate the family knew of the child's propensities 73:
The circumstances of this case fail to satisfy the third
element necessary under the Kentucky statutes to trigger a
duty to warn. Sean never communicated any threat of a
specific act of violence to the Hospital staff, nor did he
articulate a direct threat of physical harm against his
mother or any other reasonably identifiable victim. The
record reflects that the Hospital knew that Sean had
thought about hitting his mother when they had argued in
the past, that he occasionally perceived the need to "strike
out," that he had written disturbing song lyrics, and, as his
Hospital behavior confirmed, that he had a propensity
toward violent conduct. This knowledge, however, does
not constitute an actual threat of future physical harm to
Sean's mother. At most, the Hospital had available a
record of Sean's past aggressive behavior and emotional
instability, traits of which Sean's family was already well
aware. Although Sean testified that he told Hospital staff
he "might do something [he] might regret later" upon his
release, this statement would not satisfy the requirements
triggering the statutory duty to warn, since the statement
specifies neither an intended victim nor a violent act.
Under these circumstances, Kentucky law imposes no duty
on the Hospital or professionals at the Hospital to warn the
Rock family. The family was already aware of Sean's
problems. Therefore, the entry of summary judgment
against the estate on the failure to warn claim was not
error. 1
74
172 The patient also abused drugs and alcohol and this fact was known by the hospital.
See id. at * 1.
173 An "assumption of the risk" defense in the Tarasoff context is discussed in an article
by Brian Ginsburg. See Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim's Knowledge Shrinks
the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 19-20 (2004).
114 Riley, 1998 WL 598733, at *4 (footnote omitted).
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Although the court does not quibble with the sincerity of the statements, it
says that they could not be understood to be against the patient's mother,
nor could they be understood as grave in intention. The court does not
express why the communication/locution did not rise to the level of a
threat/pledge that would trigger the duty. Basically, the court is saying that
the locution did not "sound like a threat." But it is also saying that no
specific act of violence was articulated. This is more problematic, because
the patient's statement that he "might do something he would regret later,"
in context, amounts to a conditional commissive. Apparently, the court is
troubled by this, but gets around the problem by saying that the victim of
this commissive is too vague to trigger the duty, i.e., even if one factor for
satisfying the essential condition is extant, word choice, another is missing
and defeats it: specificity of victim. Additionally, the court brings an
assumption of the risk rationale into play, something the statute does not
reflect.
4. A Case of Good Faith
Culberson v. Chapman1 75 involved a counselor's "good faith"
disclosure of a patient's threat against his employer.
176
During a group session with Mattson [one of the
counselors] on or around December 22, 1989, respondent
[the patient] stated that if he could "get away with it," he
would kill "him" or follow "him" when "he" was driving
after drinking and advise the police of the driving conduct.
Respondent did not identify the person referred to as
"him." Mattson advised respondent that if his comment
was serious, she would have to report it. Respondent did
not respond because he assumed Mattson knew he was not
serious. Mattson's notes in respondent's chart do not
make reference to this incident.
Later that day during the afternoon group session,
conducted by Chapman [another counselor], respondent
repeated the prior statement, although he again did not
identify the person referred to as "him." Respondent never
stated directly in any group session that he wanted to kill
175 496 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
176 Id. at 822.
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or harm Mr. O'Neil [the person Chapman believed to be
responsible for his termination]. Chapman never asked
respondent if he was serious and never mentioned the
statement to him.
77
The patient sued for the damages he alleged were suffered because of the
disclosure. 78 The court held that Minnesota's rule, which allows for a
"good faith effort to warn against or take precautions against a client's
violent behavior," 179 required a showing of actual malice to destroy the
therapist's statutory immunity.' 80 From a procedural standpoint, the case is
interesting because of the counselor's questioning the patient's seriousness
and advising the patient a disclosure would be made if he was serious.'
81
The court relates that the patient did not answer the counselor, and
assumed she understood he was not serious. 182 The fact is, under the rule
as written, whether the patient was "serious," in the sense of "sincere," is
irrelevant. The duty is triggered if the therapist heard a felicitous
threat/pledge. 83  The problem with the kind of "probing" of intent
illustrated in Culberson is that it implies a duty has not yet arisen, or awaits
a "perfected" locution. Attempts to suborn more information, or to elicit a
recantation, may or may not have an effect on the duty that has already
arisen. The point is that the duty has arisen upon the utterance of the
felicitous threat/pledge.
5. A Case of Composite Evidence
In Marshall v. Klebanov,184 New Jersey's Supreme Court considered
whether the threat/pledge of suicide posed by a patient was sufficiently
imminent to impose a duty to warn under the New Jersey statute. 185 Under
that iteration of the rule, a duty arises either when:
177 Id. at 822-23.
178 Id. at 823.
171 MINN. STAT. § 148.975(7) (2005).
"80 Culberson, 496 N.W.2d at 825.
"' Id. at 822.
112 Id. at 822-23.
181 Id. at 824-25.
14 902 A.2d 873 (N.J. 2006).
185 Id. at 875, 880.
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1. [t]he patient has communicated to that practitioner a
threat of imminent, serious physical violence against a
readily identifiable individual or against himself and the
circumstances are such that a reasonable professional in
the practitioner's area of expertise would believe the
patient intended to carry out the threat; or
2. [t]he circumstances are such that a reasonable
professional in the practitioner's area of expertise would
believe the patient intended to carry out an act of
imminent, serious physical violence against a readily
identifiable individual or against himself.
186
The second section would include circumstantial evidence of a homicidal
or suicidal tendency. Therefore, the first section should delineate verbal or
non-verbal communications of a "threat"; the second section should
delineate neither of those things, but instead impose a duty based on a
composite of circumstantial evidence that indicated homicidal or suicidal
tendencies to a reasonable professional.
On its way to preserving a common law right to sue for breach of
professional standards of care, over and apart from the statutory duty, 87
the court held:
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
we agree with the trial court's findings on imminency.
The decedent's husband testified that, in the two weeks
preceding his wife's suicide, he did not perceive an
imminent threat of her taking her life. The decedent's
mother similarly stated that when she spoke with her
daughter over the phone on the morning of her suicide, she
did not do or say anything that seemed alarming and that
"[s]he sounded pretty good." Moreover, although
plaintiffs expert, Dr. Simring, found that defendant
assessed a "high risk of suicide" when he examined the
decedent on January 7, 2000, Dr. Simring's report does not
assert that defendant should have recognized the decedent
as an imminent threat to herself. Finally, it is the alleged
'86N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000).
187 Marshall, 902 A.2d at 882.
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abandonment by defendant of the decedent that prevented
defendant from determining whether an imminent threat of
suicide existed.
188
As there is no record of a verbal communication to the therapist, the court
is attempting to assess the composite evidence. 89  But the exonerating
evidence presented and analyzed-the impressions of family members as
to the imminence of the patient's threat to herself-was never
communicated to the therapist.' 90 Indeed, it was the charge in Marshall
that the therapist effectively abandoned his patient.' 91 As such, there was
no speech act, and liability could only proceed from the second part of the
statute, based upon the foreseeability of the event. 92 Finally, the other
conditions of the requisite speech event-sincerity and gravity of physical
harm-are not discussed.
193
The charge of abandonment in Marshall suggests similar scenarios,
ones in which therapists, even those keeping close contact with their
patients, avoid circumstances or conversations that might trigger a duty to
warn. That was an early, and still somewhat persistent, criticism of such
duties by the psychiatric profession: to skirt potential liability, therapists
might be hesitant to enter those areas of therapy that could pose Tarasoff
duties-an evasion that would be detrimental to their patients. 94 Whether
or not a therapist can successfully "not know" or "not hear" a felicitous
"' Id. at 883.
189 See generally id.
190 See generally id.
191 Id. at 875. The court remanded the decision for a determination on common law
grounds. Id. at 882-83.
192 Id. at 882.
193 The word "serious" seems to modify the type of physical harm here, and carries no
semantic value of "sincerity" as it does in other statutes; New Jersey appears to require
sincerity by the word "intends." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-16 (West 2000). Capability is
not part of the New Jersey statutory conditions. Id.
194 See Rosenhan et al., supra note 38, at 1188-89 (Tarasoff may lead to a reduction in
patients seeing therapists and may affect the way therapists approach their patients.). But
see John G. Fleming & Bruce Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's
Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REv. 1025 (1974) ("[I]t is far from clear whether qualified
confidentiality has disturbed the effectiveness of psychotherapy.").
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threat/pledge would seem to present another dilemma, one of adequate
care, as the Marshall case represents.
6. A Case of Prior Knowledge
In McIntosh v. Milano,195 the New Jersey Superior Court adopted a
duty to warn rule.196 Evidence sent back for consideration included the
patient's statements to his therapist, over a two-year period, that he had
fantasies "on various subjects, including fantasies of fear of other people,
being a hero or an important villain, and using a knife to threaten people
who might intimidate or frighten him."'197 The patient also related to the
therapist "experiences and emotional involvements" with the victim (which
the therapist came to believe), admitted to shooting a B.B. gun at a car
belonging to the victim or her boyfriend, and showed the therapist a knife
he carried to protect himself and intimidate others.
198
The therapist stated:
[The patient] wished Miss McIntosh [the victim] would
"suffer" as he did and had expressed jealousy and a very
possessive attitude towards her, was jealous of other men
and hateful towards her boyfriends, had difficulty
convincing himself that fights or things were really over or
finished, [but the therapist] denied that Morgenstein [the
patient] ever indicated or exhibited any feelings of
violence toward decedent or said that he intended to kill
her or inflict bodily harm. Morgenstein was also very
angry that he had not been able to obtain Miss McIntosh's
phone number when she moved from the family home. 1
99
Subsequent to an incident in which the patient stole a prescription sheet
from a pad in the doctor's office and sought to obtain a prescription for
Seconal (which he abused), the patient killed the victim with a pistol.
20 0
The therapist stated that though he had never talked to the victim or her
'9 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979).
I96 d. at 509.
197 Id. at 503.
198 Id.
'99 Id. at 503-04.
200Id. at 504 & n.5.
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parents, he had talked to the patient's parents from time to time about his
statements in therapy. 20 1 The expert witness for the defense opined that:
[e]ven though a diagnosis of dangerousness is... a
complex determination, in his opinion that
[dangerousness] was not an issue since Morgenstein
demonstrated his dangerousness by (a) firing a weapon at
Miss McIntosh's car, (b) exhibiting a knife to Dr. Milano,
(c) forging a prescription, and (d) verbalizing threats
towards Miss McIntosh and her boyfriends. In light of this
and the commission of a violent act, i.e., firing the gun,
dangerousness was not in his opinion a prediction, but a
known fact.
202
Though prior to the enactment of the duty to warn statute, the expert
witness here set out facts of which the therapist was aware, ones that
pertain to conditions necessary for establishing a felicitous threat/pledge:
the preparatory condition of capability, exhibited by the patient's
possession of a weapon and propensity to use the same, as well as his
abuse of Seconal; the sincerity condition, exhibited by past violent acts and
violent delusions in therapy; and the essential condition of word choice and
demeanor, exhibited by rage, obsessiveness, and locutions that he wished
the patient "to suffer as he had," entailing physical harm against a
reasonably identifiable victim. The propositional content condition of
imminence is at question, but evidence as to the non-conditionality of the
threat, the exclusive, obsessive focus of the patient's intentions, and the
fact that the patient had committed a crime the very day of the incident,
would inform the temporal context necessary for determining imminence.
7. A Case of Imminence
The temporal context, which is relevant to a determination of
imminence, as it concerns how impending the danger is, was again at issue
in Little.203 Also at issue was the immediate context, which concerns the
201 Id.
202 Id. at 506.
203 Dennis Little appeared at his wife's house on two consecutive days despite being




expression of the locution, and therefore the recognizability of the
threat/pledge as a threat/pledge.204 Regarding the question of imminence,
the court said:
Evidence concerning defendants' first contact with Dennis
in May 1989 does not support a liability claim under
[Arizona Revised Statutes] § 36-517.02, which requires a
threat of "imminent" physical harm or death. Thus, HDI's
May 11, 1989 assessment that "[c]lient appears at risk of
hurting himself or his wife, has made threats to that effect
during the last few days, by his own admission &
according to his wife," has no bearing on HDI's statutory
duty of care in October.20 5
However, the patient had said two days before that he "was afraid [he]
might hurt [his wife]" and that his "stupid thoughts" included murder and
suicide.2°  While the court was careful to conform to the explicit
requirements of the detailed Arizona statute, which fronts all conditions,
the court rejected linguistic realities by ignoring all context, as well as the
fact that locutions may be explicit, though indirect. The patient's
statement that he was "afraid [he] might hurt [his wife]," though in the
syntactic form of an expressive, articulating his fear (and in the context of
requesting help from a hospital, also a directive, in the sense of a "plea"),
has the indirect illocutionary force of a commissive, a statement of
intention, or pledge to harm. That the expression of fear may weaken an
argument for imminence, in that the reticence might indicate some degree
of control, would have to be considered in the context of a man who was
brought to a treatment center for placing a butcher knife beside his wife's
bed.
20 7
encounter. Little v. All Phoenix S. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 919 P.2d 1368, 1370-71
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995).
204 See id. at 1373-74.
2°1Id. at 1374 n.3.
206Id. at 1370.
207Id. at 1371. Each condition can influence and inform the others. For example, the
man's capability (he had access to knives), and his sincerity (having a history of violence
towards his family) would affect just how "conditional" the statement was. If it is not truly
conditional, then the threat is more imminent.
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8. A Case of Capability
Pettus v. Cole208 involved a scenario in which a patient sued his
therapists under the medical privacy act for disclosing statements he made
to them about his employers.2 9 Interestingly, the therapists did not claim a
duty to warn, and in fact said that the patient had not posed a threat to his
supervisors210; in fact, a statement made about hitting one of his
employers 211 was considered, in context, to be indicia of a normal coping
mechanism:
Specifically, Dr. Unger said: "[I]n assessing the possibility
that Mr. Pettus [the plaintiff] may do bodily harm to
someone, it is important to keep in mind that Mr. Pettus is
a man of middle age who has no history of acts of
violence. Fantasies of performing violent acts are actually
quite common in human experience, and are entertained
from time to time by even the most gentle of human
beings. Rather than being predictive of future violence,
such fantasies actually serve as a psychological 'safety
valve,' permitting the vicarious, but safe and harmless
discharge of strong emotions. Experiencing the fantasy of
taking violent revenge often reduces the impulse of
performing the behavior. There is a very great and very
crucial difference between merely thinking about
performing some action, and the physical doing of that
act. 212
In effect, the therapists in Pettus argued against the capability and sincerity
conditions of the "threat"-using the patient's history and age to be
informative factors. The court noted that had the therapists been alerted to
a serious threat, they would have had a duty to warn.213
208 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
209 Id. at 55.
210 Id. at 60.
211 See id. at 59 n.11.
212
/d. at 60 n.14.
211 Id. at 76.
[37:27
BACK FROM WONDERLAND
9. Three Cases Involving Gravity
The facts of McCarty v. Kaiser Hill Co. 214 involved a plaintiff-patient
who sued his psychologist for disclosing an alleged threat against the
plaintiff's supervisors.215 The psychologist argued that the Colorado duty
to warn statute made him immune from liability.21 6 The statute provides,
in pertinent part:
A... psychologist, or other mental health
professional... shall not be liable for damages in any civil
action for failure to warn or protect any person against a
mental health patient's violent behavior, and any such
person shall not be held civilly liable for failure to predict
such violent behavior, except where the patient has
communicated to the mental health care provider a serious
threat of imminent physical violence against a specific
person or persons.1 7
The patient called the psychologist at 1:30 a.m., talked for more than one
hour, and stated that he was "feeling sort of homicidal., 2 8 He told the
psychologist that he was acquainted with martial arts, could kill someone if
provoked, and that though his supervisors did not deserve to die, "they
[did] deserve to have their ass kicked., 21 9 The psychologist informed the
patient that he had to warn the supervisors and subsequently did so.
220
While the court held that the psychologist had properly discharged his
duty, because he had received "a serious threat of imminent physical
violence against a specific person or persons, 22' the court did not elaborate
upon how it determined that the statement amounted to the requisite
statutory standard. Of the four possible elements that comport with the
felicity conditions of a threat/pledge-sincerity, imminence, gravity, and
capability-the Colorado statute employs only three: sincerity (it would
214 15 P.3d 1122 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
2151 d. at 1123-24.
216 See id. at 1124-25.
217 CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-117 (2008).
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seem "serious" modifies "threat" here, in the sense of "sincere" rather than
"grave," as the requirement that the violence be "physical" seems intended
to ensure gravity), imminence, and gravity. However, the factors that the
court used to determine these elements go undiscussed. The statement,
"[T]hey don't deserve to die but they do deserve to have their ass kicked,"
is not in the form of a commissive but is arguably a representative with the
illocutionary force of a commissive. That is, when said in the context of a
man who is "feeling sort of homicidal," the locution is more properly
classified as a statement of intention, rather than the representation of a
fact.222 If so, then the essential condition of the threat's recognizabilty as a
grave threat/pledge against a specific person is satisfied.223
Gravity was also at issue in Jenks v. Brown,224 a 1996 Michigan
appellate decision. The Michigan statute requires the communication of a
"threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable" victim,
coupled with "the apparent intent and ability to carry out that threat in the
foreseeable future ... .,,22' Hence, the statute includes all four of the
conditions for a threat/pledge: capability ("ability"), sincerity ("intent"),
imminence ("foreseeable future"), and gravity (physical violence against a
reasonably identifiable victim). The Jenks court faced a situation in which
the patient sought to kidnap her child, who was in the plaintiff's sole
custody, and take him "underground. 226 Although the court did not have
222 The court here tacitly, and correctly from a linguistic standpoint, finds the statement
explicit in a way that the court in Little would not.
223 In Peck, the Vermont Supreme Court held that a mental health agency had a duty to
warn the plaintiff, whose son committed arson on his property, even though the patient
expressed his locution in a suppositional way. Peck v. Counseling Serv. of Addison
County, Inc., 499 A.2d 422, 423-24, 427 (Vt. 1985). When asked how the patient would go
about his expressed desire to "get back at his father," the patient replied: "I could burn
down his barn." Id. at 424. As in McCarty, the Peck court apparently interpreted the
representative statement as an indirect commissive. The sincerity condition, informed by
the historic context, though undiscussed, must also have been met. Though the locution is
not conditional, other determinatives of its imminence, informed by the temporal context of
the speech act, were also left undiscussed.
224 557 N.W.2d 114, 117 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996).
225 MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 330.1946(1) (1999).
226 Jenks, 557 N.W.2d at 116. The Jenks court decided the matter on the grounds that
the plaintiff's complaint did not allege a threat against his son, and consequently there was
no duty to warn. Id. at 117.
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to address whether the threatened act was one of "physical violence," 227
thereby satisfying the requisite level of gravity for the duty, the case
provides an example of how only the law, by clear and consistent
delineation, can fix the semantic value to a term key to the essential
condition. From a linguistic perspective, a pledge need not be "physically
violent"; that requirement is solely a legal contribution. For liability to
arise, the rules generally say that the "threat" must be of a certain type-
one that is particularly grave (violence against self, other, or property
damage that could lead to loss of life, are the three instantiations of
gravity). And as such, the locution that a reasonable therapist must
recognize as a threat/pledge is one that intends the delineated gravity. Of
the four felicity conditions for a threat/pledge, this informs the parameters
of the essential condition. But "physical violence" is a broad term. Does
absconding with and sequestration of a child amount to "physical"
violence, or only to a type of non-physical, metaphoric violence? Only the
legislature could make this determination, or the courts, based on whatever
policy determinatives are consistent with the legislative intent.
An example of a case that attempts to set such semantic limits to the
term "serious," in the sense of "grave," is Ewing v. Goldstein.228 Using the
state's penal code, the Ewing court, in dicta, elaborated upon the statute's
requirement that the communication be a "serious threat of physical
violence., 229  The court suggested a meaning for the kind of gravity
required:
Although every case must be decided on its own facts, we
conclude a therapist's duty to breach a patient's
confidence in favor of warning an intended victim could
also arise if the therapist becomes aware the patient
intends to commit an act or acts of grave bodily injury
short of murder, but akin to "mayhem" or "serious bodily
injury" as defined by statute. (See Pen. Code, § 203
["Every person who unlawfully and maliciously deprives a
human being of a member of his body, or disables,
227 Id. The court later notes that "[b]ecause there was no serious danger of violence to
the plaintiff, any" duty the psychiatrist might have owed to the plaintiff's son would not
encompass the plaintiff as well. Id. at 117-18.
228 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
229 CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007).
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disfigures, or renders it useless, or cuts or disables the
tongue, or puts out an eye, or slits the nose, ear, or lip, is
guilty of mayhem."], 243, subd. (0(4) ["'Serious bodily
injury' means a serious impairment of physical condition,
including, but not limited to, the following: loss of
consciousness; concussion; bone fracture; protracted loss
or impairment of function of any bodily member or organ;
a wound requiring extensive suturing; and serious
disfigurement."]).
230
The court went on to hold that though the therapist had not received a
communication from the patient regarding an intention to injure the
ultimate victim, it was for the trier of fact to determine whether a
communication from the patient's father to that effect would have
amounted to the requisite threat.231 However, the court was dismissive of
an argument suggested by the victim's parents, an argument that gets to the
very heart of the problem related to the specific wording in "duties to
warn." The parents claimed that the statute was:
ambiguous because it [was] not clear whether the term
''serious," as used in the phrase "serious threat of physical
violence," refers solely to the patient's state of mind, or
whether it must instead be read as a part of the phrase
"serious threat," referring to the probability of harm or its
magnitude. They also claim the statutory phrase "physical
violence against" is unclear because it fails to specify
whether a threat of physical injury to an actual person is
required as opposed to an item of the target individual's
property, or whether the therapist's duty to warn is
triggered if a patient's expresses his intention to "gently
slap or pinch a victim.,,
232
The court held such arguments were "[d]ivorced from reality," and that in
keeping with legislative intent and policy, the statutory duty arises
230 Id. at 874-75.
231 Id. at 875. Among other things, the case is notable for extending the required source
of the information from the patient himself to family members of the patient. Id at 873.
23 2 Id. at 874.
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regardless of the definition of "serious. 23 3 In short, the court implies that
the statutory language is clear on its face. But the thrust of the victim's
parents' argument is closer to the linguistic reality that the court so
forcefully rejects. The locution that must be communicated for a duty to
arise must have certain features-felicity conditions-for that locution to
be a threat/pledge. Those conditions, as has been stated, involve
imminence (uncovered in the California statute); capability (also
uncovered); sincerity (which is the subject of the court's perorations, and
which is ostensibly covered by the term "serious"); and by way of statutory
imperative, gravity.234  But gravity can also be implied by the term
"serious," as in the sense of a "grave threat," in which case the sincerity of
the threat/pledge would go uncovered by the language of the statute.
Without a clear delineation of discrete terms, the language of the statute
would be redundant. Therefore, it matters very much what the legislature
meant by "serious." It so happens that in this case, because "physical
violence" seems meant to cover gravity, the canons of statutory
interpretation would prevent a redundancy by dictating that the term
"serious" cover sincerity. But the larger point is that the California
legislature does not front all aspects of the linguistic reality that establish a
felicitous pledge, let alone the legally-fashioned threat/pledge, because the
conditions of capability and imminence are missing. Although the
legislature and court might argue that those terms are assumed and covered
by "threat," not all courts and legislatures deem them so, as evidenced by
more precise articulations of the rule.235 This is all to say that demands for
clarity should not be dismissed. If liability turns upon the communication
of the speech act, as it does in California,236 then a recognition of all of the
speech act's dimensions-and a clearer delineation of factors that would
determine their existence-should be articulated, not assumed. The final
section of this article makes a proposal to supply them.
237
233 Id.
234 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007).
235 See generally supra Part III.
236 § 43.92(a) (imposing liability only "where the patient has communicated" the threat).
237 In Calderon v. Glick, 31 Cal. Rptr. 3d 707(Cal. Ct. App. 2005), decided one year later
and in the same district as Ewing v. Goldstein, the court held that a therapist was immune
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V. MISREADINGS OF THE TRIGGERING EVENTS
IN DUTY TO WARN LAWS
The aim of this article has been to illustrate that the dilemma Tarasoff
duties pose for the legal system arises in part from a failure to focus upon
the catalytic event: the speech act that triggers the duty. For in both the
statutory and common law dedicated to limiting the duty, the utterance of a
felicitous threat/pledge is the occasion for imposing liability. Therefore,
whether the therapist understood or should have understood the
communication to be a felicitous threat/pledge must be the focus of judicial
determination. From the preceding cases, it is clear the courts do not
understand that to be the case. Instead, they look at prior events-
statements made or violent history-but without marshalling this evidence
towards a determination of whether the communication constitutes a
threat/pledge. This is true for both verbal and non-verbal communications,
because "foreseeability" is only another way of saying that the composite
circumstances have amounted to a non-verbal threat; that is, without a
verbal expression, it can only be foreseeable that the patient meant to harm
the victim if it is determined that the circumstances involved: 1) a capable
patient; 2) sincerely intent on visiting grave harm; 3) on a specific person;
4) imminently.
"looked at [Rodriguez] straight in the face clearly and ... said, 'Do you
have any intention to hurt your former girlfriend, Maria
Calderon,' ... ?" Rodriguez "looked at [Dr. Wright] straight and he
said no." Dr. Wright "looked at [Rodriguez's] body language and there
was no fluctuation, there was no deviation." He "concluded that at that
time [Rodriguez] was not a risk." Accordingly, the trial court properly
ruled that the failure to warn causes of action were precluded as a
matter of law.
Id. at 712. Here, although another court fails to say why precisely the duty to warn did not
arise, this court apparently holds that no communication of a threat/pledge occurred. The
therapist, with knowledge of the patient's history, assessed the patient's demeanor and
locution-which was in fact a denial-and determined it was sincere. The locution was a
representative-a denial of the interrogative posed-and there was no implicature raised of
an implied threat/pledge. The kind of assessment that the therapist made in Calderon is
indicative of the contextual features that inform several of the felicity conditions for a
pledge to harm, as will be explained in the final proposal suggested in Part VI.
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With this appreciation of the communication's centrality in a Tarasoff
context comes a commensurate appreciation of how important it is to
determine when a felicitous threat/pledge has been made. This article has
attempted to explain what linguistics, particularly in the field of
pragmatics, can provide to such a discussion-indeed must provide to such
a discussion-in order for legal analysis to comport with linguistic reality.
A failure to acknowledge the indispensability of linguistic analysis leaves
judicial opinions in a muddled state, with courts overlooking or failing to
elaborate upon what precise grounds a particular locution was sufficiently
"sincere," "grave," or "imminent," and thereby gave rise to the duty. For
however specific a rule meant to limit liability may be written, a
threat/pledge may be stated indirectly, implicitly, non-literally, etc. and
from a linguistic perspective, is no less explicit as a result. An attempt to
ensure that only "explicit" threats trigger the duty can result in a perverse
distortion-ones in which the meaning is clear by implication, but the duty
is defeated by judicial adherence to dictionary definitions. 238  This
confusion has given rise on one hand to cases that find threats to be
obvious, requiring no need for expert testimony,239 and on the other to
those that impose a duty, but give no clear basis for that liability, other than
to say that the therapist "should have known" or "could have foreseen.
' 240
This only begs the questions: Considering the catalytic event, what
precisely should have been known? What should have been foreseen?
What made the locution serious, imminent, etc.? What factors went into
the courts' determination? What would reasonable professionals have
known that would have made them understand the locution to be a
felicitous threat/pledge?
Two cases highlight the problem born from failing to understand both
what triggers the duty and what limits that duty must have. Though they
come to opposite conclusions, together the cases illustrate the mischief that
duty to warn rules can potentially work.
231 See Little v. All Phoenix S. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 919 P.2d 1368, 1370
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); see also notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
239 See, e.g., Ewing v. Northridge, Hosp. Med. Ctr., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591, 600 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2004).
240 See, e.g., Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. for Human Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1040
(Pa. 1998) ("should have determined").
2008]
CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
In Emerich, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that
predictions of violent behavior were not completely outside the mental
health professional's abilities, as evidenced by the fact that mental health
professionals must make such assessments under involuntary commitment
procedures. 241 There, the therapists complained that a duty to warn
standard should be rejected because therapists are in no better position than
anyone else to make such predictions.242  The court stated that
"[s]pecifically, the [Mental Health Procedures Act] in its procedures for
involuntary mental health treatment mandates a determination of whether
an individual poses a clear and present danger of harm to others or to
himself. Obviously, some understanding and prediction of dangerousness
is required in making this determination. '2 43 The court went on to quote
McIntosh: "To find that a determination of dangerousness is so uncertain
[as] to be no better than a coin toss, and thus, preclude liability, would
raise 'serious questions.., as to the entire present basis for commitment
procedures." '' 244 Finally, the court noted that "mental health professionals
are trained to detect, identify, evaluate and deal with threats and violent
behavior, thus, setting themselves apart from others who are faced with the
knowledge of threats of violence against a third party.,
245
The unique abilities to assess the danger that the majority found
convincing enough to impose the duty were lost on one concurring judge.
Justice Zapalla argued that though therapists may have access to more
information than other citizens, this is not a basis for imposing the duty and
does not create a "special relationship" between the therapist and the
246patient. More troublesome yet for Justice Zapalla was that, in the event
liability were to turn upon access to information concerning a real threat,
there would be no reason not to extend the duty further:
If threats are specific and immediate and the person to
whom the threats are revealed knows or reasonably should
know that there is a serious risk of harm, why would not
241 Id. at 1041.
242 Id.
243 Id. (citation omitted).
244 Id. (quoting McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500, 514 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1979)).
241 Id. at 1041-42.
246 Id. at 1046 (Zappala, J., concurring).
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the duty extend to them as well? To be sure, what would
be considered reasonable for a mental health professional
to know might differ from what would be considered
reasonable for someone without specialized training to
know, but a difference in what is reasonable for particular
parties does not impact on the question of whether a duty
should be recognized in the first instance.247
Justice Zapalla's objection is well worth noting, as a failure to find
anything unique in the therapist's abilities to make the assessment leaves
the extension of the duty only a matter of the right circumstances. For
example, a family member who has just as much control over the disturbed
person as the therapist, and has just as much access to information about
his violent intentions, could be required-mutatis mutandis-to conform to
some applicable standard of reasonableness. Likewise, a standard could be
imposed upon a criminal defense attorney who has been implicitly apprised
of his client's intention to make sure that a certain witness "does not
appear" at trial. Without an appreciation of the limits of the rule, an
extension of the liability beyond the current therapist/patient parameters
only awaits the right court and the right circumstances. And if the "special
relation[ship]" posited by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315, and
adopted for the basis of the duty by the Tarasoff court,248 is not founded on
more than mere control, but also on medical expertise and diagnostic
powers-as the Tarasoff opinion suggests249-the duty could easily be
expanded just as Justice Zapalla warns. But as this article stresses, the
standard of reasonableness should turn upon whether-given the
professional's knowledge of the patient's history, capabilities, etc.-and
his skill in assessing the same, he should have understood the locution to
be a threat/pledge. That is what triggers the duty.
While Emerich found the mental health professional uniquely qualified
to assess the threat, the court in Ewing v. Northridge Hospital25° held that
expert opinion on whether the appellant should have known that his patient
247 Id.
248 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 557-58 (Cal. 1974) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)), vacated, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
249 Id. at 558 (Cal. 1974), vacated, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
250 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (a twin case to Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004)).
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had uttered a threat was irrelevant.25' The court held that the standard was
one of actual belief:
Today, a psychotherapist may be held liable for failing to
warn a third party of a threat of harm only if the plaintiff is
able to persuade the trier of fact the psychotherapist
actually believed or predicted the patient posed a serious
risk of inflicting grave bodily injury upon a reasonably
identifiable victim or victims.
2 52
The court said that lay opinion as to whether a threat was uttered or not is
sufficient under a common knowledge standard, and that the lower court
was incorrect in requiring expert testimony as to whether the threat should
have been considered "serious" or not: "However, 'a serious threat of
physical violence' is defined, it is not beyond the layperson's ken to
understand that a patient's threat to take another's life, if believed, is
'serious. ',253 This flies in the face of linguistic analysis. In fact, threats or
pledges to harm are among the most difficult linguistic acts to determine,
21and their expression can be made in a variety of indirect ways. But the
larger point is that the court fails to appreciate that the proper enquiry is
not whether the therapist actually believed there was a danger. According
to the language of the California statute itself, the enquiry is whether a
threat/pledge was actually "communicated., 255 If so, the duty is triggered.
The question is whether, given what the therapist knew from the context,
he should have understood the locution to be a threat/pledge.
Another danger in the Ewing court's dismissal of expert testimony is
that there is no longer any reason to limit the duty, or to assign it. If the
courts do not tie liability to the therapist's unique skill in assessing
information, the basis for the obligation is unmoored. Indeed, the Tarasoff
duties first arose from a view rooted in diagnostics. The Tarasoff court
based the duty on Restatement section 315, which assigns a duty running
to third parties for injuries they suffer at the hands of those that the liable
party was in a "special relationship" with, meaning that a party had a "duty
251 Id. at 600.
252 Id.
211 Id. at 600 & n.6 (citation omitted).
254 See Fraser, supra note 35, at 170-71.
255 CAL. CrV. CODE § 43.92(a) (West 2007) (emphasis added).
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to control. 256 To exemplify a "duty to control," Tarasoff cites a case in
which a doctor misdiagnosed an illness and was responsible to a third party
injured by that misdiagnosis. 257 The court said:
The role of the psychiatrist, who is indeed a practitioner of
medicine, and that of the psychologist who performs an
allied function, are like that of the physician who must
conform to the standards of the profession and who must
often make diagnoses and predictions based upon such
evaluations. Thus the judgment of the therapist in
diagnosing emotional disorders and in predicting whether
a patient presents a serious danger of violence is
comparable to the judgment which doctors and
professionals must regularly render under accepted rules of
responsibility.
25 8
So the duty to control in Tarasoff carries with it the connotation of
something akin to a duty to control the disease (not so much control over
movement)-i.e., a duty to assess and treat the patient appropriately-as a
reasonable professional would. It is the communication that triggers the
duty, which is imposed on the grounds that the therapist has a prerequisite
duty to manage the mania, assess it correctly. Particularly, there is a duty
to assess correctly the mania's manifestation in the form of
communications and threatening circumstances (depending upon the rule).
That is why it is incorrect to say the therapist is responsible for not
predicting the violence-a charge therapists so strenuously reject, citing
their inability to predict violence.259 Instead, the correct basis of liability
stems from failing to assess the communication correctly, based on what
the therapist knew and should have assessed as a reasonable therapist. In
other words, the liability does not arise for failure to predict violence; it
arises for failure to recognize the locution for what it is: a threat/pledge.
256 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 343 (Cal. 1976) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).257 1d. at 344 (citing Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970) (imposing liability on third party where physician did not properly diagnose
tuberculosis and third party was infected).
25 Id. at 345.
259 See id. at 354 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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The locution's recognizability will be a function of what a reasonable
professional would have determined it to be, given what he should know of
the patient and his ability to assess/weigh those factors (capability,
sincerity, imminence, gravity).
Of course, a court is free to reject any kind of special relationship
between a doctor and a patient-as the Virginia Supreme Court did in
Nasser v. Parker26 0 -and thereby reject the duty. But once the rule is
established, as in the California case of Ewing, it makes no sense to see the
duty as arising from anything less than a duty to assess/diagnose. As such,
expert opinion is required to determine what a reasonable therapist should
have understood the patient to have meant by the particular locution.
In addition, such an understanding will limit the expansion of the duty.
This is because the liability rests in "assessment of information"
capabilities, not just in "access to information." If it were only the latter,
the liability could creep further out towards mere knowledge; there would
be no reason why close relatives with whom the patient lives, or defense
attorneys-people privy to as much if not more information as the
therapist-should not also have a duty to warn when they hear a felicitous
threat/pledge. But if the liability rests in therapists' unique ability to assess
language-which is a skill definitive of the profession-then it is akin to
the liability of an engineer brought in to fix a perilous dam. If he
undertakes the job, and does not apply the requisite skill in assessing a
problem-say a fissure that has formed in the surface-he is liable for
injuries that result from the fissure's rupture and the dam's collapse.
Likewise, the therapist's liability arises from a failure to meet the
professional standards that would rightly understand a threat/pledge for
what it is.
VI. A PRAGMATIC PROPOSAL
This judicial confusion over the catalytic event, coupled with the
differing opinions as to the assessment powers of therapists and the role
such faculties should play, creates a shifting area of jurisprudence. What
this article attempts is to couple the proper understanding of the catalytic
event with the proper role of the therapist's assessment. For failing to
understand that it is the speech act that triggers the duty leaves unanswered
the therapist's argument regarding inability to foresee the danger. Also, if
260 455 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1995).
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the duty does not hinge on both the therapist's unique access to
information and on his unique ability to assess that information, there is no
reason to limit the duty to therapists. But understanding that it is the
locution that triggers the duty, and that the felicitousness of the act can be
determined based upon the unique cache of information that only the
therapist is in a position to have and assess, limits the scope of the duty. It
also ensures that the reasonableness of professional judgment has a place.
The analysis proposed below necessarily conflates two things:
linguistics and professional standards.26' It undertakes a pragmatic analysis
to determine if "a pledge to harm" occurred at all, but uses special felicity
conditions constructed from information that only the therapist would have
access to and be able to evaluate, given the professional standards of his
field. That is, the felicity conditions below use the professional standards
of the field to determine if a felicitous threat/pledge has been made.
Again, the duty to warn is triggered if a "threat" (i.e., pledge) was
communicated.
For a felicitous pledge to harm that would trigger a duty to warn the
following conditions would have to exist:
Preparatory Condition: The speaker would obtain satisfaction from
something detrimental to the victim and has the capability to accomplish
that detriment. The first part of this condition-satisfaction-is academic,
subjective, and ultimately indeterminable; only the second part of the
condition has legal significance: the speaker's objective capability to
perform the act. Therefore, the capability context affects the preparatory
condition. Determinatives of this context-all within information
available to the therapist-would include:
261 A recent article in the psychotherapeutic field has suggested a variety of factors to
determine the risk of violent behavior, including "substance abuse, impaired sleep, intense
anger, provocative interpersonal perception, delusional justification of harm, explosive
aggression occasioned by subtle situational cues, impulsive affect, cognitive schemas
dispositional to harm, or tensions associated with family or work relationships." Michael R.
Quattrocchi & Robert F. Schopp, Tarasaurus Rex: A Standard of Care That Could Not
Adapt, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y, & L. 109, 125 (2005); see also Michael Craig Miller, A
Model for the Assessment of Violence, 7 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 299, 300 (2000)
(identifying factors for determining a propensity for violence); M. Dolan & M. Doyle,
Violence Risk Prediction: Clinical and Actuarial Measure and the Role of the Psychopathy
Checklist, 177 BRiT. J. PsycmATRY 303 (2000) (reviewing checklist of violence predictors).
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Physical Ability (i.e., the speaker is physically capable of
doing what he intends)-size, strength, age.
Aptitude (demographic factors that the psycho-therapeutic
field considers common to those prone to violence)--
gender, race, socio-economic group, existence of
substance abuse, whether the speaker lives alone and
without support, medical conditions, access to weapons,
etc.
The focus of this condition is on the assessment of the speaker himself;
that is, in determining that the speaker can do what is intended.262
Sincerity Condition: The speaker wants to inflict the detriment. Again,
whether the speaker truly, subjectively wants to inflict the harm or not is
legally irrelevant and ultimately indeterminable. What matters is whether
objectively he should be taken as sincere. What the hearer knows of the
speaker is relevant in determining earnestness, and therefore the historic
context 263 affects the sincerity condition. Determinatives of this context-
all within information available to the therapist-would include past
communications between the speaker and the hearer regarding:
Speaker's past acts in general;
Acts vis-A-vis the intended victim;
262 In criminal contexts, speakers often intentionally front the speaker's capability in
order to heighten the intimidation factor. E.g., "You know who and what I am, don't you?
As I am a short-tempered and cold-hearted person, I dislike delay."; "I have a remote
controlled device for (a stick) of dynamite." Yamanaka, supra note 91, at 43; see also
Kevin S. Douglas & Jennifer L., Skeem, Violence Risk Assessment: Getting Specific About
Being Dynamic, 11 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'Y & L. 347 (2005) (reviewing empirical research on
violence assessment).
263 The mental health professional's understanding of the historic context was considered
relevant in determining the reasonableness of care in Little v. All Phoenix S. Cmty. Mental
Health Ctr., Inc., 919 P.2d 1368, 1374 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). In agreeing that the plaintiff
had a common law claim, the court in Little noted the expert witness's opinion that the
therapists had failed to "adequately inquire into [the patient's] history of assaultive/suicidal
behavior and past hospitalizations, failure to review [the patient's] prior hospital records
and failure to hospitalize him in October." Id.
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Consensus view of the speaker by others, particularly a
threatened class;
264
Speaker's response to treatment;
Speaker's degree of impulsivity;
History of hospitalization/commitment/jail; and
Whether speaker was a victim of abuse in the past.
The focus here is on the seriousness of the speaker's intention. That is,
whether or not the speaker means to do it.
Essential Condition: The hearer understands the locution to be a
threat/pledge. For purposes of the Tarasoff duties, the rules impose
additional dimensions to this condition. Whereas in any other context, a
threat/pledge need not be limited to physical intentions (indeed, for a
pledge, it need not even be harmful), nor need it be absolutely specific as
to the threatened party, the Tarasoff rules require that the locution be both
265grave and against a clearly or reasonably identifiable person.  The way
that the locution is stated affects its recognizability as a threat/pledge.
Therefore, the immediate context of its statement affects this condition.
Determinatives of this context-all within information available to the
therapist-would include:
Word choice (i.e., semantic choice; as has been shown,
meaning can be conveyed in direct or indirect ways, but
must at least include words of the requisite nature-
implying physical harm, self-harm, etc-and words
264 See Barry v. Turek, 267 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
265 In Bardoni v. Kim, 390 N.W. 2d 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986), the court sent back to the
trier of fact the determination of whether the therapist made sufficient inquiries as to the
nature of the patient's schizophrenic paranoia. Id. at 226-27. It was for the trial court to
determine whether, had the doctor made those enquiries, he might have known exactly
whom the patient thought was "attacking him (i.e., his brother), and that the patient was
laying the groundwork to attack those persons." Id. at 227. Here, the court implies that the
specificity of the target is something that the therapist cannot leave ambiguous. If all of the
other conditions are extant for a pledge to harm, the judicially-imposed aspect of the
essential condition-the specificity of the victim--might be something that a jury could
find a reasonable therapist should have attempted to obtain.
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How involved/detailed the plan to commit the act has
become; and
Whether there was a sincere recantation.266
The focus of this condition is on how recognizable the threat/pledge is to
the hearer qua threat/pledge. At issue is whether it sounded like/looked
like a threat/pledge.
Propositional Content Condition: The Speaker makes a statement of
intention to do something detrimental to the victim in the near future.
Imminence of the intended harm is the focus here, and therefore the
condition is affected by the temporal context. Determinatives of that
context-all within information available to the therapist-would include:
266 The court in Emerich commented upon the possible effect of a recantation:
Even though Appellant has pled in his complaint that Joseph was
permitted to leave the Center based solely upon his assurances that he
would not harm Ms. Hausler, we do not believe that this fact would
defeat his assertion of a duty to warn as a matter of law. The
recantation of a threat would certainly be relevant to the issue of
whether the mental health professional knew or should have known,
pursuant to the standards of his profession, that the patient presented a
serious danger of violence to a third party. However, we cannot say, in
light of the standard for judgment on the pleadings, that an assurance
that the patient would not harm a third party, as a matter of law,
precludes the finding of a duty to warn.
Emerich v. Philadelphia Ctr. for Human Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1044 n.14 (Pa. 1998).
The relevance of recantations, as well as the relevance of subornation of more information
is a matter to consider. See generally Culberson v. Chapman, 496 N.W.2d 821 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993). The duty is triggered by the utterance; whether or not more information
relieves that duty is something to which the rules currently do not speak.
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Whether the locution was conditional, and whether the
condition is not immediately surmountable;
Whether there are geographic or other impediments to the
completion of the act, such as distance (the speaker lives
on a different continent) or circumstance (the speaker is in
jail), etc.
The point of this condition is to determine that the speaker will not delay.
The determinatives for each condition listed above are not hard and
fast. Some might establish both sincerity and capability, for example, or
one might be evidence of all four. The list is certainly not exhaustive.
With contributions from the mental health care field, the list may be
modified, and perhaps even prioritized. One feature might be more
important than another, e.g., a tendency towards impulsivity trumping all
other determinatives listed in the historic context that inform the sincerity
condition. In other words, the analytical paradigm proposed above is
organic and amenable to growth. But there has been an attempt to keep the
conditions discrete, both for the sake of clarity and in order to make the
determinatives useful as factors by which an analysis of speech acts can be
made.
VII. CONCLUSION
With an understanding that the catalytic event that triggers the duty is
the speech act itself, and that the speech act in the Tarasoff context can be
assessed in terms of information that the mental professional has unique
access and ability to evaluate, the law in this area can become clearer. The
determinatives above, used as factors, can be employed to decide whether
a reasonable mental health professional should have understood the act to
be a felicitous threat/pledge, thereby triggering the duty. Such an analysis
limits the scope of the duty to warn-assuaging the fear of liability
"creep"-to the mental health care field, while at the same time tying the
liability to a concrete event, the speech act, in quantifiable terms. As such,
both those in the legal and mental health fields are better equipped to
accommodate the rules. Lawyers and judges can better understand when
the duty arises, and what evidence speaks for a reasonable disposition of
duties, while mental health professionals can plan and document the
collection of necessary information for assessing the event. The reasons
for these tragic situations are random and mystifying; they often defy any
logic, any explanation. But the legal disposition of such matters, some
thirty odd years after Tarasoff, should now move onto more solid ground.
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